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A Priori Justification$
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Albert Casullo

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780195115055

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0195115058.001.0001

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A Priori Knowledge and Necessary Truth

A Priori Knowledge and Necessary Truth

(p.185) 7 A Priori Knowledge and Necessary Truth
A Priori Justification

Albert Casullo (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

The two questions have dominated traditional discussions of a priori knowledge: What is its relationship to necessary truth? What is its relationship to analytic truth? Answering them is not necessary to answer the two primary epistemological questions about a priori knowledge: What is it? Does it exist? This chapter argues that the prominence of questions about the relationship between the a priori and the necessary derives from two traditional views: the rationalist conception of a priori knowledge and Kant’s claim that necessity is a criterion of the a priori. Independent grounds for rejecting both are offered, and it is argued that the two primary epistemological questions about a priori knowledge can be answered without resolving the disputes over its relationship to necessary truth.

Keywords:   a priori, knowledge, contingent, criterion, Kant, necessary, truth, necessity, rationalism

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