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A Priori Justification$
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Albert Casullo

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780195115055

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0195115058.001.0001

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The Opposing Arguments

The Opposing Arguments

Chapter:
(p.112) 5 The Opposing Arguments
Source:
A Priori Justification
Author(s):

Albert Casullo (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0195115058.003.0006

The leading arguments against the existence of a priori knowledge are addressed. The opposing arguments fall into three broad categories: conceptual arguments, which offer an analysis of the concept of a priori knowledge and allege that no cases of knowledge satisfy the conditions in the analysis; radical empiricist arguments, which offer radical empiricist accounts of knowledge of propositions alleged to be knowable only a priori; and incompatibility arguments, which maintain that a priori knowledge is incompatible with epistemic naturalism. This chapter contends that the negative arguments fail: the conceptual arguments impose implausible conditions on a priori knowledge; the radical empiricist accounts do not establish that the propositions in question are not also known a priori; and the incompatibility arguments fail to show that a priori knowledge is incompatible with either of the two leading forms of epistemic naturalism: philosophical and scientific.

Keywords:   a priori, conceptual argument, incompatibility argument, epistemic naturalism, philosophical naturalism, radical empiricist, scientific naturalism

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