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A Priori Justification$
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Albert Casullo

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780195115055

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0195115058.001.0001

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The Leading Proposals

The Leading Proposals

Chapter:
(p.9) 1 The Leading Proposals
Source:
A Priori Justification
Author(s):

Albert Casullo (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0195115058.003.0002

This chapter provides a taxonomy of widely endorsed conditions on a priori justification. The conditions fall into two broad categories: epistemic, which includes defeasibility, strength, and source conditions; and nonepistemic, which involves the concepts of analyticity or necessity. Two major claims are argued: (1) nonepistemic conditions are neither necessary nor sufficient for a priori justification, and (2) if a theory imposes epistemic conditions on the a priori that differ from those it imposes on the a posteriori, they must be supported by independent argument or rejected as ad hoc. Two defensible conditions on a priori justification emerge; justification by a nonexperiential source, and justification that is not defeasible by experience.

Keywords:   analyticity, defeasibility, defeasible, epistemic, experiential, necessity, nonepistemic, nonexperiential, source, strength

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