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Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality$
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Alvin Plantinga and Matthew Davidson

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780195103762

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0195103769.001.0001

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Transworld Identity or Worldbound Individuals?

Transworld Identity or Worldbound Individuals?

Chapter:
(p.72) 3 Transworld Identity or Worldbound Individuals?
Source:
Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality
Author(s):

Alvin Plantinga (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0195103769.003.0004

The Theory of Worldbound Individuals (T.W.I.) is the view that each object exists in just one possible world. In this chapter, I argue that (a) there is no good reason to accept T.W.I. and (b) T.W.I. has implausible consequences. I begin by demonstrating that traditional arguments for T.W.I., including the Problem of Transworld Identification, are based on confusion and do not pose problems for the thesis that objects exist in more than one possible world. In the final section of the chapter, I argue that T.W.I. entails that every object has all of its properties essentially. Moreover, T.W.I. entails this even if it is fortified with David Lewis's Counterpart Theory.

Keywords:   counterpart theory, essential, David Lewis, possible worlds, property, Transworld Identification, worldbound individuals

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