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Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality$
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Alvin Plantinga and Matthew Davidson

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780195103762

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0195103769.001.0001

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Replies to My Colleagues

Replies to My Colleagues

Chapter:
(p.176) 9 Replies to My Colleagues
Source:
Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality
Author(s):

Alvin Plantinga (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0195103769.003.0010

In this essay, I consider several objections raised by John Pollock against my account of modality. I define possibilism – i.e., the view that there is a property that does not entail existence, but is entailed by every property – and then give a more adequate definition of actualism based on its disagreement with possibilism. Pollock argues that the property of nonexistence is such that objects exemplify it in worlds in which they do not exist and based on this fact concludes that serious actualism is false. I give an argument that nonexistence is necessarily unexemplified and a separate argument for the conclusion that serious actualism is true. I conclude the essay by arguing that it does make a difference whether we accept existentialism or essentialism.

Keywords:   actualism, essentialism, existence, existentialism, nonexistence, John Pollock, possibilism, property

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