Kant maintained that morality is a system of categorical imperatives. Categorical imperatives are supposed to have some for of rational necessity. Through a critical discussion of Williams's account of internal and external reasons and Korsgaard's account of Kantian practical reason, we see that Kant defended a plausible combination of strong reason internalism and weak motive internalism. An internalist approach to morality must begin with the perspective of the deliberating moral agent. In this very important sense, moral principles are necessarily agent‐centered. Consequentialism, however, can be fully agent‐centered in the requisite sense. The requirement to promote the good of all can be an agent‐centered requirement and even an agent‐centered constraint of the maximization of one's own good. Kantian internalism is fully compatible with a consequentialist categorical imperative.
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