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From Morality to Virtue$
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Michael Slote

Print publication date: 1995

Print ISBN-13: 9780195093926

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0195093925.001.0001

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Two Kinds of Intrinsic Goodness

Two Kinds of Intrinsic Goodness

(p.184) 12 Two Kinds of Intrinsic Goodness
From Morality to Virtue

Michael Slote (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Two different kinds of intrinsic goodness are often conflated. A state of affairs can be intrinsically good (e.g. the virtuous being happy), but certain things can be intrinsically good for a person, a constitutive element in his or her welfare. These notions do not come together, as Kant's example of the prosperous but evil individual manifestly indicates: intuitively, such a state of affairs is in itself intrinsically bad but is nonetheless intrinsically good for, i.e. beneficial to, the prosperous individual. Any virtue ethics needs to keep these concepts distinct.

Keywords:   beneficial, good for a person, good state of affairs, intrinsically good, virtue ethics

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