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Warrant and Proper Function$
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Alvin Plantinga

Print publication date: 1993

Print ISBN-13: 9780195078640

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0195078640.001.0001

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Epistemic Probability: Some Current Views

Epistemic Probability: Some Current Views

Chapter:
(p.137) 8 Epistemic Probability: Some Current Views
Source:
Warrant and Proper Function
Author(s):

Alvin Plantinga (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0195078640.003.0008

In circumstances where one proposition A (or group of propositions G) is propositional evidence for another proposition B, my believing A (or G) can confer warrant (for me) upon B. I use the term “epistemic probability” to refer to the relationship between a pair of propositions A and B when A is propositional evidence for B; more precisely, in those cases, I shall say that the epistemic conditional probability of B on A is high. In this chapter and the next, I concern myself with an analysis of epistemic conditional probability. The first thing to see, in trying to get a general grasp of this topic, is to note the divide between epistemic probability and objective probability. In this chapter, I distinguish the former from the latter and point out some debilitating problems with the three main accounts of the former (Bayesianism, the logical theory of probability, and the account of Henry Kyburg); in the next chapter, I propose what I hope is a better substitute.

Keywords:   Bayesianism, epistemic probability, Kyburg, logical theory of probability, objective probability, probability, propositional evidence, warrant

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