Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Warrant: The Current Debate$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Alvin Plantinga

Print publication date: 1993

Print ISBN-13: 9780195078626

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0195078624.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 19 October 2019

Pollockian Quasi‐Internalism

Pollockian Quasi‐Internalism

Chapter:
(p.162) 8 Pollockian Quasi‐Internalism
Source:
Warrant: The Current Debate
Author(s):

Alvin Plantinga (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0195078624.003.0008

In this chapter, I examine John Pollock's conception of warrant, as developed in his article “Epistemic Norms” and his book Contemporary Theories of Knowledge. I argue that his official view of warrant is deeply flawed, foundering as it does on the possibilities of cognitive malfunction. As Pollock uses the phrase, an epistemic norm is a rule describing the circumstances under which it is epistemically permissible to hold beliefs. Central to Pollock's account are several claims about epistemic norms, which I take pains to dispute. After considering several problems with Pollock's conception of warrant, I proceed to argue that, while Pollock describes his theory of knowledge as an internalist view, it is in fact internalist in name only, being not a species of internalism, but a sort of transitional stage to a more satisfactory view of warrant.

Keywords:   epistemic norms, internalism, Pollock, warrant

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .