In this chapter, I examine John Pollock's conception of warrant, as developed in his article “Epistemic Norms” and his book Contemporary Theories of Knowledge. I argue that his official view of warrant is deeply flawed, foundering as it does on the possibilities of cognitive malfunction. As Pollock uses the phrase, an epistemic norm is a rule describing the circumstances under which it is epistemically permissible to hold beliefs. Central to Pollock's account are several claims about epistemic norms, which I take pains to dispute. After considering several problems with Pollock's conception of warrant, I proceed to argue that, while Pollock describes his theory of knowledge as an internalist view, it is in fact internalist in name only, being not a species of internalism, but a sort of transitional stage to a more satisfactory view of warrant.
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