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Warrant: The Current Debate$
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Alvin Plantinga

Print publication date: 1993

Print ISBN-13: 9780195078626

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0195078624.001.0001

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Classical Chisholmian Internalism

Classical Chisholmian Internalism

Chapter:
(p.30) 2 Classical Chisholmian Internalism
Source:
Warrant: The Current Debate
Author(s):

Alvin Plantinga (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0195078624.003.0002

In order to examine the relationship between warrant and justification, I turn, in this chapter, to the views of Roderick Chisholm, or, more precisely, to the classical Chisholm (as expressed in editions one and two of his Theory of Knowledge and in his The Foundations of Knowing). In important respects, the classical Chisholm's internalism displays much continuity with the deontological internalism of Descartes and Locke. The classical Chisholm's official position on warrant (or positive epistemic status, as he calls it) is that warrant is a matter of fulfilling epistemic obligation – a matter of a proposition's being so related to a person that he can better fulfill his epistemic duty by accepting the proposition in question than by, e.g., withholding acceptance. Against Chisholm, I argue that (1) most of Chisholm's epistemic principles are false if warrant is what Chisholm officially says it is, and that (2) the fulfillment of epistemic duty (i.e., epistemic justification in its original and most natural sense) is neither sufficient nor necessary for warrant.

Keywords:   Chisholm, internalism, justification, positive epistemic status, warrant

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