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Warrant: The Current Debate$
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Alvin Plantinga

Print publication date: 1993

Print ISBN-13: 9780195078626

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0195078624.001.0001

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Justification, Internalism, and Deontology

Justification, Internalism, and Deontology

(p.3) 1 Justification, Internalism, and Deontology
Warrant: The Current Debate

Alvin Plantinga (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

In this chapter, I introduce the notion of warrant (that quantity, enough of which is what distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief), and then turn to examine the connections between (epistemic) deontology, justification, and internalism. Central to deontology is the thought that being justified in holding a belief is a matter of having fulfilled one's epistemic duties in forming or continuing to hold that belief. The basic thrust of internalism is that the properties that confer warrant upon a belief are properties to which the believer has some sort of special epistemic access. After a brief survey of the great diversity in twentieth‐century views about justification, I argue that internalism flows from deontology, and that we can better understand twentieth century views about justification when we understand the relationships between deontology, justification, and internalism.

Keywords:   deontology, internalism, justification, knowledge, warrant

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