Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Philosophical Papers Volume II$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

David Lewis

Print publication date: 1987

Print ISBN-13: 9780195036466

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0195036468.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 19 June 2019

Causal Decision Theory

Causal Decision Theory

Chapter:
(p.305) Twenty‐Seven Causal Decision Theory
Source:
Philosophical Papers Volume II
Author(s):

David Lewis

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0195036468.003.0012

When confronted with Newcomb problems, decision theory yields the wrong answer. This paper argues for an improved decision theory that is sensitive to causal distinctions. The causal theories of Skyrms, Sobel, and others are surveyed, and an objection against causal decision theories in general is deflected. The paper includes a postscript dealing with two criticisms by Rabinowicz.

Keywords:   causal decision theory, decision theory, Gibbard, Harper, Newcomb problem, Rabinowicz, Skyrms, Sobel

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .