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Contextualising KnowledgeEpistemology and Semantics$
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Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780199682706

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: July 2017

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199682706.001.0001

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(p.183) 6 Assertion
Contextualising Knowledge

Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa

Oxford University Press

This chapter takes up the knowledge norm of assertion, according to which assertion is governed by the constitutive norm that one may assert only what one knows. The relationship between such norms and contextualism is controversial—some philosophers have argued that there is a special problem for this combination of views, and others have argued that the knowledge norm provides direct support for contextualism. This chapter rejects both kinds of simple connections. The book's relevant alternatives approach to knowledge, however, combined with Stalnakerian approaches to assertions and conversational contexts, is suggestive of an underexplored interpretation of the knowledge norm—the incremental knowledge norm of assertion, according to which what is required for proper assertion depends on its incremental conversational effect.

Keywords:   assertion, knowledge, knowledge norm of assertion, context, incremental knowledge norm of assertion

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