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Contextualising KnowledgeEpistemology and Semantics$
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Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780199682706

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: July 2017

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199682706.001.0001

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Action

Action

Chapter:
(p.139) 5 Action
Source:
Contextualising Knowledge
Author(s):

Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780199682706.003.0006

This chapter defends a connection between knowledge and practical reasoning, according to which one’s reasons for action constitute all and only that which one knows. A variety of intuitive objections to such principles are considered and rejected—a central theme is that objectors to knowledge norms often make tacit but substantive ethical assumptions about which reasons, if held, would justify which actions. Absent broader ethical theorizing, the proposed counterexamples are inconclusive. The chapter sketches possible approaches to such theories, and indicates reason for optimism about knowledge norms. It also considers the degree to which knowledge norms imply externalism about rational action, suggesting that many internalist intuitions and verdicts may be accommodated and explained by knowledge norms.

Keywords:   knowledge, practical reasoning, action, ethics, internalism

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