This chapter articulates a knowledge first theory of doxastic justification—a belief is justified just in case it is relevantly similar to a possible instance of knowledge. In the terminology of the chapter, justification is “potential knowledge”. Relevant similarity is a matter of a matching of basic evidence and cognitive processing. This needn't be assumed to be a matter of the intrinsic; on the externalist approach to basic evidence given in Chapter 3, for one's belief to be justified is for there to be a possible knower who shares the same basic evidence—including factive perceptual states—and cognitive processing. The Appendix to Chapter 4 considers how the view extends to justified beliefs in necessarily false contents.
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