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Contextualising KnowledgeEpistemology and Semantics$
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Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780199682706

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: July 2017

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199682706.001.0001

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(p.105) 4 Justification
Contextualising Knowledge

Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa

Oxford University Press

This chapter articulates a knowledge first theory of doxastic justification—a belief is justified just in case it is relevantly similar to a possible instance of knowledge. In the terminology of the chapter, justification is “potential knowledge”. Relevant similarity is a matter of a matching of basic evidence and cognitive processing. This needn't be assumed to be a matter of the intrinsic; on the externalist approach to basic evidence given in Chapter 3, for one's belief to be justified is for there to be a possible knower who shares the same basic evidence—including factive perceptual states—and cognitive processing. The Appendix to Chapter 4 considers how the view extends to justified beliefs in necessarily false contents.

Keywords:   knowledge, justification, doxastic justification, basic evidence

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