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Contestants, Profiteers, and the Political Dynamics of MarketizationHow Shareholders gained Control Rights in Britain, Germany, and France$
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Helen Callaghan

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780198815020

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2018

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198815020.001.0001

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The Political Dynamics of Marketizing “Corporate Control”

The Political Dynamics of Marketizing “Corporate Control”

Chapter:
(p.21) 2 The Political Dynamics of Marketizing “Corporate Control”
Source:
Contestants, Profiteers, and the Political Dynamics of Marketization
Author(s):

Helen Callaghan

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198815020.003.0002

Chapter 2 provides background information pertaining to the regulation of takeover bids, to clarify how political struggles surrounding shareholder rights elucidate the political dynamics of marketization. Four considerations motivated the case selection. First, the so-called market for corporate control cannot arise spontaneously and is prone to market failure, because corporate control is a fictitious good in need of commodification by means of market-enabling rules. Second, the rules governing this market are politically contentious because they have significant distributional implications. Third, struggles surrounding these rules pit different kinds of equally well-endowed profit-oriented opportunists against one another. Fourth, the process started a long time ago and played out differently in different countries, partly due to variation in the political salience of hostile bids.

Keywords:   corporate control, commodification, principal–agent problem, market failure, shareholder rights, takeover regulation, hostile bids, minority shareholders, poison pills, issue salience

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