Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Vol 7$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Mark C Timmons

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198808930

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2017

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198808930.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 10 December 2018

How Moral Uncertaintism Can Be Both True and Interesting

How Moral Uncertaintism Can Be Both True and Interesting

Chapter:
(p.98) 5 How Moral Uncertaintism Can Be Both True and Interesting
Source:
Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Vol 7
Author(s):

Andrew Sepielli

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198808930.003.0006

Several philosophers have tried to develop a framework for decision-making in the face of fundamental moral uncertainty. Critics argue that the project is misguided, as it assumes that there’s a kind of “subjective” rightness that depends on which moral views might be true (rather than which ones are true). This chapter replies to some such criticisms presented by Elizabeth Harman. Harman argues that “moral uncertaintists” seem committed to counterintuitive views about what’s right and what we’re culpable for, and that the only way of modifying the uncertaintist position to escape these commitments renders it uninteresting. However, uncertaintism can avoid these counterintuitive implications by focusing on epistemic probabilities of moral claims rather than subjective ones, and by positing different “orders” of subjective rightness. Further, the version of uncertaintism Harman calls “uninteresting” is not; it specifies what would count as one’s best try at doing what she has objective reason to do.

Keywords:   moral uncertainty, Elizabeth Harman, subjective rightness, epistemic probability, trying

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .