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Thick Evaluation$

Simon Kirchin

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198803430

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2017

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198803430.001.0001

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(p.189) Bibliography

(p.189) Bibliography

Source:
Thick Evaluation
Author(s):

Simon Kirchin

Publisher:
Oxford University Press

Bibliography references:

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