Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The New Mechanical Philosophy$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Stuart Glennan

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198779711

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2017

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198779711.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 17 January 2019

Mechanisms, Models, and Kinds

Mechanisms, Models, and Kinds

(p.87) 4 Mechanisms, Models, and Kinds
The New Mechanical Philosophy

Stuart Glennan

Oxford University Press

This chapter explores how mechanisms and their constituents can be classified into kinds. It argues for a weakly realist account of natural kinds—one which suggests that classification into kinds is based upon real similarities between instances of those kinds, but which denies that kinds have essences or have some reality apart from their instances. I introduce a models-first account of kinds, which suggests that two things are of the same kind to the extent that they can be represented by the same model. Because target entities can be represented by multiple models, they will belong to multiple kinds. I illustrate the approach by showing how the entities and activities that make up mechanisms can be classified into kinds.

Keywords:   natural kind, mechanism, classification, model, kind

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .