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Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition$
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Philip Robichaud and Jan Willem Wieland

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198779667

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: July 2017

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198779667.001.0001

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Blame Transfer

Blame Transfer

Chapter:
(p.281) 16 Blame Transfer
Source:
Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition
Author(s):
Jan Willem Wieland, Philip Robichaud
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198779667.003.0016

Many philosophers accept derivative blameworthiness for ignorant conduct, i.e. the idea that the blameworthiness for one’s ignorance can “transfer” to blameworthiness for one’s subsequent ignorant conduct. This chapter asks the question what it actually means that blameworthiness would transfer, and explores four distinct views and their merits. On views (I) and (II), one’s overall degree of blameworthiness is determined by factors relevant to one’s ignorance and/or one’s subsequent conduct, and transfer only involves an increase in scope. On views (III) and (IV), one’s overall degree of blameworthiness is determined by factors relevant to one’s ignorance as well as one’s subsequent conduct, and transfer might not only entail an increase in scope, but also in degree.

Keywords:   ignorance, blameworthiness, transfer, tracing, scope, degree, consequential luck, benighting act, unwitting act

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