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Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition
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Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition

Philip Robichaud and Jan Willem Wieland

Abstract

Philosophers have long agreed that moral responsibility might not only have a freedom condition, but also an epistemic condition. Moral responsibility and knowledge interact, but the question is exactly how. Ignorance might constitute an excuse, but the question is exactly when. Surprisingly enough, the epistemic condition has only recently attracted the attention of scholars, and it is high time for a full volume on the topic. The chapters in this volume address the following central questions. Does the epistemic condition require akrasia? Why does blameless ignorance excuse? Does moral ignor ... More

Keywords: responsibility, ignorance, knowledge, excuse, blameworthiness, epistemic condition, quality of will, reasonable expectation, benighting act, unwitting act

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2017 Print ISBN-13: 9780198779667
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: July 2017 DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198779667.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Philip Robichaud, editor
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

Jan Willem Wieland, editor
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam