- Title Pages
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- 1 Why Study Bundles of Reforms?
- 2 To Reform or Not to Reform?
- 3 The Changes to Core Democratic Rules in Western Europe, 1990–2010
- 4 Disentangling the Long- and Short-Term Determinants of the Reforms of Core Democratic Rules
- 5 The Mechanisms of Institutional Reforms in Action
- 6 You Win Some, You Lose Some
- 7 An Unexpected Journey
- 8 Bundling the Bundles
- 9 Conclusion
- Appendix 1 Complete List of the Reforms of Core Democratic Rules Adopted in the Eighteen Western European Democracies, 1990–2010
- Appendix 2 Detailed Criteria of the Classification of Reforms in the Function of their Scope (Substantial vs. Minor)
- Appendix 3 Detailed Criteria of the Classification of Reforms in the Function of Their Direction (Inclusive vs. Exclusive)
- Appendix 4 Explanatory Variables for the Descriptive Models on Long-Term Determinants of Reform
- Appendix 5 Summary of the Spread of the Explanatory Variables for the Descriptive Models on Long-Term Determinants of Reform
- Appendix 6 Explanatory and Control Variables for Models 1 to 6
- Appendix 7 Actual Distribution of the Total Number of Reforms Adopted by Legislature Compared to the Poisson and the Negative Binomial Distribution
- Appendix 8 Determinants of the Number of Institutional Reforms Adopted by Legislature in Western Europe (1990–2010), Omitting One Dimension
- Appendix 9 Determinants of the Number of Substantial Institutional Reforms Adopted by Legislature in Western Europe (1990–2010)
- Appendix 10 Methodology of the Case Studies
- Appendix 11 Main Institutional Reforms Promised in the Manifestos of the Major Irish Parties, 2011
Bundling the Bundles
Bundling the Bundles
Coalition Dynamics and Institutional Reforms in Italy, 2003–2006
- (p.208) 8 Bundling the Bundles
- Reforming Democracy
- Oxford University Press
The failed constitutional reform and the successful electoral reform occurring in Italy between 2003 and 2006 constitute archetypical examples of the dynamics behind divisive institutional reforms conducted through a majoritarian process. The main argument of this chapter is that the very presence of four coalition partners with different priorities has led to the formulation and negotiation of an ever wider bundle of institutional reforms. First, this large bundle has been built in order to accommodate the diverging priorities and preferences of the government coalition by giving something to each party. Second, the very dynamic of trade-offs and the anticipation of the effects of the reforms have led the reformers to include more and more provisions in the deal, eventually evidencing the crucial importance of time management in the final outcome of the two reforms.
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.