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IdealismNew Essays in Metaphysics$
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Tyron Goldschmidt and Kenneth L. Pearce

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198746973

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2018

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198746973.001.0001

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The Idealism of Mary Whiton Calkins

The Idealism of Mary Whiton Calkins

(p.142) 9 The Idealism of Mary Whiton Calkins

Kris McDaniel

Oxford University Press

At the beginning of the twentieth century, idealism was the metaphysical view to be beat. Mary Whiton Calkins was an important early twentieth-century philosopher (and psychologist), and a prominent advocate of a version of idealism. This chapter assesses her version of idealism. Among the topics discussed are whether the absolute is a person, whether finite persons have free agency, whether there is a correspondence between apparent physical objects and minds, and the status of relations. In addition, her version of idealism is contrasted with the idealistic views of some of her contemporaries, including F. H. Bradley and J. M. E. McTaggart.

Keywords:   Calkins, absolute idealism, persons, personalism, McTaggart, Bradley, relations

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