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Kant and the Philosophy of MindPerception, Reason, and the Self$
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Anil Gomes and Andrew Stephenson

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198724957

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: July 2017

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198724957.001.0001

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Imagination and Inner Intuition

Imagination and Inner Intuition

Chapter:
(p.104) 6 Imagination and Inner Intuition
Source:
Kant and the Philosophy of Mind
Author(s):

Andrew Stephenson

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198724957.003.0006

This chapter addresses the question of whether intuition is object-dependent. Kant’s account of the imagination appears to suggest that intuition is not object-dependent. On a recent proposal, however, the imagination is a faculty of merely inner intuition, the inner objects of which exist and are present in the way demanded by object-dependence views, such as Lucy Allais’s relational account. It is argued that this proposal is problematic on both textual and philosophical grounds. The proposal is inconsistent with what Kant says about how the imagination functions and it is ultimately incompatible with the relational account it is supposed to support. Kant’s account of the imagination remains a serious obstacle for the view that intuition is object-dependent.

Keywords:   Kant, object-dependence, imagination, inner intuition, hallucination, memory, perception, presence, consciousness

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