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Kant and the Philosophy of MindPerception, Reason, and the Self$
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Anil Gomes and Andrew Stephenson

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198724957

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: July 2017

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198724957.001.0001

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Are Kantian Intuitions Object-Dependent?

Are Kantian Intuitions Object-Dependent?

Chapter:
(p.67) 4 Are Kantian Intuitions Object-Dependent?
Source:
Kant and the Philosophy of Mind
Author(s):

Stefanie Grüne

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198724957.003.0004

In recent years, it has often been argued that Kantian intuitions are strongly object-dependent in the following sense: An intuition of a subject S is strongly object-dependent if and only if for having the intuition it is necessary that at the time at which S has the intuition the object of the intuition exists. In this chapter, four different arguments for the claim that Kantian intuitions are strongly object- dependent are analysed, and it is argued that none of them are persuasive.

Keywords:   Kant, intuition, object-dependence, a priori intuition, space, time, cognition

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