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Kant and the Philosophy of MindPerception, Reason, and the Self$
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Anil Gomes and Andrew Stephenson

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198724957

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: July 2017

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198724957.001.0001

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Understanding Non-Conceptual Representation of Objects

Understanding Non-Conceptual Representation of Objects

Empirical Models of Sensibility’s Operation

(p.46) 3 Understanding Non-Conceptual Representation of Objects
Kant and the Philosophy of Mind

Katherine Dunlop

Oxford University Press

This chapter endorses Lucy Allais’s attribution of a non-conceptualist view to Kant and her methodology of appealing to contemporary cognitive science. In particular, it agrees with Allais that intuition should be understood as the result of cognitive processing (rather than as brutely given). But the chapter argues that Allais’s choice of ‘binding’ as an empirical model (for the generation of intuition) is not apt, proposing instead that the processing that generates intuition should be taken to implement empirically-identified ‘principles of object perception’. It is argued that representation conforming to these principles need not qualify as conceptual by Kant’s standards.

Keywords:   Kant, intuition, non-conceptualism, binding, infants’ object cognition

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