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Kant and the Philosophy of MindPerception, Reason, and the Self$
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Anil Gomes and Andrew Stephenson

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198724957

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: July 2017

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198724957.001.0001

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The Lessons of Kant’s Paralogisms

The Lessons of Kant’s Paralogisms

Chapter:
(p.245) 14 The Lessons of Kant’s Paralogisms
Source:
Kant and the Philosophy of Mind
Author(s):

Paul F. Snowdon

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198724957.003.0014

The overall question of this chapter is: what relevance do Kant’s Paralogisms have for current philosophy? After characterising Kant’s negative points about rational psychology, it is argued that once we abandon transcendental idealism and we appreciate that Kant’s assumption that we lack intuitions of ourselves is problematic, then Kant’s approach lacks a convincing basis. It is further argued that Strawson’s much more favourable reading of Kant’s argument relies on certain conceptual assumptions that are also unwarranted. The major and important lesson for our time, it is suggested, is that Kant identifies a serious weakness in a popular style of pro-dualist reasoning.

Keywords:   Kant, paralogisms, rational psychology, transcendental idealism, the self, Strawson, pro-dualist arguments

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