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Kant and the Philosophy of MindPerception, Reason, and the Self$
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Anil Gomes and Andrew Stephenson

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198724957

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: July 2017

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198724957.001.0001

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Subjects of Kant’s First Paralogism

Subjects of Kant’s First Paralogism

(p.221) 13 Subjects of Kant’s First Paralogism
Kant and the Philosophy of Mind

Tobias Rosefeldt

Oxford University Press

According to the standard interpretation of the First Paralogism, its fallacy is based on a confusion between two meanings of the term ‘subject’, namely that of ‘thinking subject’ and that of ‘subject of predication’. This chapter argues that this interpretation is incorrect and that Kant in fact explains the illusion of cognizing ourselves as thinking substances by a misinterpretation of a certain logico-semantical feature of the representation ‘I’, namely that of non-predicability. This interpretation puts the First Paralogism in accord with the other Paralogisms, all of which are claimed by Kant to stem from a confusion between ‘logical’ and ‘real’ features of the self. It also allows us to relate the chapter on the paralogisms to Kant’s views on the connection between the ideas of pure reason and the progress towards the unconditioned in chains of prosyllogisms.

Keywords:   Kant, paralogisms, self, subject, ‘I’, logical vs. real, prosyllogism, unconditioned

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