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U.S. Attorneys, Political Control, and Career Ambition
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U.S. Attorneys, Political Control, and Career Ambition

Banks Miller and Brett Curry

Abstract

United States Attorneys (USAs), the chief federal prosecutors in each judicial district, are key in determining how the federal government uses coercive force against its citizens. How much control do national political actors exert over the prosecutorial decisions of USAs? In this book, the authors investigate this question using a unique data set of federal criminal prosecutions between 1986 and 2015 that captures both decisions by USAs to file cases as well as the sentences that result. Utilizing intuitions from principal-agent theory, work on the career ambition of bureaucrats and politici ... More

Keywords: United States Attorney, federal prosecutor, prosecutorial discretion, political control, career ambition, political science, Department of Justice, principal-agent theory, criminal law, USA

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780190928247
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2018 DOI:10.1093/oso/9780190928247.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Banks Miller, author
University of Texas at Dallas

Brett Curry, author
Georgia Southern University