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The New Economic PopulismHow States Respond to Economic Inequality$

William Franko and Christopher Witko

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780190671013

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2017

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190671013.001.0001

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(p.184) Appendix B

(p.184) Appendix B

Source:
The New Economic Populism
Author(s):

William W. Franko

Christopher Witko

Publisher:
Oxford University Press

Data and Results

Appendix B

Figure B.1: Income Inequality Trends in Midwestern States (Gini Coefficient), 1970–2012

Appendix B

Figure B.2: Income Inequality Trends in Northern States (Gini Coefficient), 1970–2012

Appendix B

Figure B.3: Income Inequality Trends in Southern States (Gini Coefficient), 1970–2012

Appendix B

Figure B.4: Income Inequality Trends in Western States (Gini Coefficient), 1970–2012

Table B.1. The Effect of Income Inequality on Public Awareness of Inequality

Δ‎ Awareness of Inequality

(1) b / (se)

(2) b / (se)

(3) b / (se)

Awareness of Inequalityt−1

−0.459***

−0.479***

−0.489***

(0.024)

(0.024)

(0.024)

Δ‎ Top 10% Income Share

31.898***

(6.067)

Top 10% Income Sharet−1

−0.999

(2.545)

Δ‎ Top 1% Income Share

23.815***

(4.260)

Top 1% Income Sharet−1

1.971

(2.416)

Δ‎ Gini Coefficient

0.638

(4.832)

Gini Coefficientt−1

0.242

(2.284)

Δ‎ Poverty Rate

0.078*

0.069*

0.070*

(0.034)

(0.034)

(0.034)

Poverty Ratet−1

0.035

0.023

0.027

(0.027)

(0.027)

(0.028)

Δ‎ Union Membership

−0.065

−0.064

−0.152+

(0.080)

(0.079)

(0.080)

Union Membershipt−1

−0.041

−0.027

−0.005

(0.047)

(0.047)

(0.047)

Δ‎ Per Capita Income

−0.037

−0.048

0.026

(0.083)

(0.082)

(0.082)

Per Capita Incomet−1

−0.019

−0.040+

−0.031

(0.024)

(0.022)

(0.021)

Δ‎ Partisanship (Dem. – Rep.)

0.097***

0.100***

0.104***

(0.010)

(0.010)

(0.010)

Partisanship (Dem. – Rep.)t−1

0.088***

0.094***

0.092***

(0.009)

(0.009)

(0.009)

Constant

36.026***

37.546***

37.934***

(1.986)

(1.848)

(2.153)

N

1200

1200

1200

Log-Likelihood

−2405.388

−2404.108

−2419.775

(+) p < .10,

(*) p < .05,

** p < .01,

(***) p < .001.

Note: Each model includes a set of time variables estimating a second- or third-order polynomial to account for any remaining trend in the first-differenced dependent variable (these estimates are not included in the table).

Table B.2. The Effect of Income Inequality on Public Awareness of Inequality, Centered Variable Model Specification

Δ‎ Awareness of Inequality

(1) b / (se)

(2) b / (se)

(3) b / (se)

Awareness of Inequalityt−1

−0.497***

−0.506***

−0.537***

(0.024)

(0.024)

(0.024)

Δ‎ Top 10% Income Share

34.527***

(6.363)

Top 10% Income Sharet−1

12.081*

(4.755)

Δ‎ Top 1% Income Share

21.370***

(4.259)

Top 1% Income Sharet−1

1.506

(2.915)

Δ‎ Gini Coefficient

−1.311

(4.672)

Gini Coefficientt−1

9.236**

(3.193)

Δ‎ Poverty Rate

0.082*

0.083*

0.080*

(0.037)

(0.037)

(0.038)

Poverty Ratet−1

0.040

0.055

0.051

(0.043)

(0.043)

(0.043)

Δ‎ Union Membership

−0.086

−0.106

−0.211**

(0.079)

(0.078)

(0.078)

Union Membershipt−1

0.064

0.021

0.047

(0.061)

(0.061)

(0.059)

Δ‎ Per Capita Income

−0.079

−0.048

0.016

(0.080)

(0.079)

(0.078)

Per Capita Incomet−1

0.006

0.002

0.016

(0.036)

(0.035)

(0.036)

Δ‎ Partisanship (Dem. – Rep.)

0.078***

0.085***

0.086***

(0.011)

(0.011)

(0.011)

Partisanship (Dem. – Rep.)t−1

0.053***

0.066***

0.059***

(0.013)

(0.012)

(0.012)

Constant

3.810***

3.400***

3.798***

(0.549)

(0.533)

(0.570)

N

1200

1200

1200

Log-Likelihood

−2373.000

−2374.632

−2382.683

+ p < .10,

(*) p < .05,

(**) p < .01,

(***) p < .001.

Note: These models are replications of the estimates presented in table B.1 with the only difference being that the variables in these models have been mean-centered as an alternative way to account for heterogeneity across states and over time. Each model includes a set of time variables estimating a second- or third-order polynomial to account for any remaining trend in the first-differenced dependent variable (these estimates are not included in the table).

Table B.3. The Effect of Awareness of Inequality on State Government Ideology

Δ‎ State Government Ideology

B

se

State Government Ideologyt−1

−0.114***

(0.013)

Δ‎ Awareness of Inequality

0.418**

(0.133)

Awareness of Inequalityt−1

0.606***

(0.120)

Δ‎ Public Mood

0.477***

(0.124)

Public Moodt−1

0.098

(0.068)

Δ‎ % White

−0.909

(0.823)

% Whitet−1

0.084**

(0.033)

Δ‎ % Age 60+

3.332

(2.326)

% Age 60+t−1

0.114

(0.145)

Δ‎ Per Capita Income

−0.011

(0.307)

Per Capita Income t−1

0.119+

(0.068)

Constant

−53.791***

(10.251)

N

1200

Log-Likelihood

−4307.248

(+) p < .10,

* p < .05,

(**) p < .01,

(***) p < .001.

Note: Each model includes a set of time variables estimating a second- or third-order polynomial to account for any remaining trend in the first-differenced dependent variable (these estimates are not included in the table).

Table B.4. The Effect of State Government Ideology on State Inequality

Δ‎ Gini b / se

Δ‎ Top 10% b / se

Δ‎ Top 1% b / se

Ginit−1

−0.090***

(0.012)

Top 10%t−1

−0.227***

(0.018)

Top 1%t−1

−0.201***

(0.017)

Δ‎ State Government Ideology

−0.007*

−0.004

−0.003

(0.004)

(0.003)

(0.004)

State Government Ideologyt−1

−0.004*

−0.004*

−0.002

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.002)

Δ‎ Union Membership

−0.031

−0.025

−0.049

(0.035)

(0.027)

(0.038)

Union Membershipt−1

0.001

0.029+

0.010

(0.008)

(0.016)

(0.014)

Δ‎ Unemployment Rate

−0.189***

−0.275***

−0.364***

(0.048)

(0.035)

(0.052)

Unemployment Ratet−1

0.092***

0.036

0.045

(0.027)

(0.024)

(0.033)

Δ‎ Per Capita Income

0.175***

0.245***

0.337***

(0.050)

(0.038)

(0.054)

Per Capita Income t−1

0.016

−0.025

0.024

(0.010)

(0.015)

(0.016)

Δ‎ % White

−0.015

0.039

0.028

(0.101)

(0.077)

(0.111)

% Whitet−1

−0.005

−0.028**

−0.005

(0.004)

(0.011)

(0.008)

Δ‎ % Age 60+

−0.306

−0.811***

−1.464***

(0.286)

(0.238)

(0.337)

% Age 60+t−1

−0.005

−0.041

−0.013

(0.018)

(0.037)

(0.033)

Constant

6.897***

11.947***

2.600**

(0.839)

(1.343)

(0.943)

N

1200

1200

1200

Log-Likelihood

−1822.319

−1516.336

−1937.044

(+) p < .10,

(*) p < .05,

(**) p < .01,

(***) p < .001.

Note: Each model includes a set of time variables estimating a second- or third-order polynomial to account for any remaining trend in the first-differenced dependent variable (these estimates are not included in the table).

Table B.5. The Effect of State Government Ideology and Federal Party Control on State Inequality

Δ‎ Gini b / se

Δ‎ Top 10% b / se

Δ‎ Top 1% b / se

Ginit−1

−0.075***

(0.013)

Top 10%t−1

−0.250***

(0.021)

Top 1%t−1

−0.263***

(0.021)

Δ‎ State Government Ideology

−0.001

−0.001

0.001

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.003)

State Government Ideologyt−1

−0.003

−0.004*

−0.003

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.002)

Δ‎ Union Membership

0.016

0.006

0.021

(0.035)

(0.026)

(0.035)

Union Membershipt−1

0.006

0.023

0.043*

(0.008)

(0.016)

(0.021)

Δ‎ Unemployment Rate

0.097

−0.134*

−0.092

(0.071)

(0.055)

(0.073)

Unemployment Ratet−1

0.114***

0.081*

0.047

(0.031)

(0.031)

(0.042)

Δ‎ Per Capita Income

0.536***

0.655***

0.678***

(0.071)

(0.054)

(0.072)

Per Capita Income t−1

−0.061***

0.010

−0.164***

(0.012)

(0.022)

(0.026)

Δ‎ % White

−0.069

−0.031

0.068

(0.095)

(0.072)

(0.096)

% Whitet−1

−0.007+

−0.025*

−0.008

(0.004)

(0.010)

(0.013)

Δ‎ % Age 60+

−0.092

−0.019

−0.701*

(0.306)

(0.260)

(0.348)

% Age 60+t−1

0.020

−0.011

0.029

(0.018)

(0.039)

(0.052)

Δ‎ Democratic President

0.491**

0.811***

0.829***

(0.151)

(0.118)

(0.160)

Democratic Presidentt−1

−0.219

−0.142

−0.382+

(0.190)

(0.145)

(0.200)

Δ‎ % Democrats in Congress

−12.933***

−8.470***

−7.141***

(1.446)

(1.060)

(1.406)

Democrats in Congresst−1

−14.559***

−15.481***

−14.898***

(1.368)

(1.118)

(1.497)

Constant

14.894***

19.466***

12.486***

(1.112)

(1.388)

(1.614)

N

912

912

912

Log-Likelihood

−1258.649

−1014.490

−1283.402

(+) p < .10,

(*) p < .05,

(**) p < .01,

(***) p < .001.

Note: Each model includes a set of time variables estimating a second- or third-order polynomial to account for any remaining trend in the first-differenced dependent variable (these estimates are not included in the table).

Table B.6. Washington Poll Survey Question Wording and Variable Coding

Variable

Question Wording

Coding

Support for 1098

Now I’m going to read a statewide ballot initiative that will appear on the November ballot: Initiative 1098 would institute an income tax on individuals earning more than $200,000 or households earning more than $400,000, and reduce state property taxes by 20 percent and also reduce the business and occupation tax and direct the increased revenues to education and health. Will you vote yes or no on initiative 1098? [Did you vote yes or no on initiative 1098?]

1 if respondent voted (if respondent voted early) or planned on voting yes, 0 if voted or planned on voting no.

Inequality is Bad

There is some talk these days about how the difference in incomes between rich people and poor people in the United States has continued to grow in the past 20 years. That is, rich people are getting richer, and poor people are getting poorer. Do you think this is a good thing, a bad thing, neither good nor bad, or haven’t you thought about it?

1 for those who think that income inequality is a “bad thing,” 0 otherwise.

Income

What was your total combined household income in 2009 before taxes. This question is completely confidential and just used to help classify the responses. Just stop me when I read the correct category. Less than $20,000; $20,000 to less than $40,000; $40,000 to less than $60,000; $60,000 to less than $80,000; $80,000 to less than $100,000; $100,000 to less than $200,000; More than $200,000

See text for discussion of various coding strategies used.

Party Identification

Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an independent, or what? [Follow up for those with no initial party affiliation:] Even though you do not consider yourself a Democrat or Republican, which of these parties do you feel closer to? Democrat, Republican, Independent/Other.

3 for Democrat, 2 for independent, and 1 for Republican.

Attention to 1098

How closely have you paid attention to information about ballot measure 1098, the proposal to establish a state income tax on the wealthy and reduce other taxes? Would you say extremely closely, very closely, moderately closely, slightly closely, or not closely at all?

1 for extremely closely or very closely, 0 otherwise.

Issue: [Education, Health Care, Taxes, and Economy]

Thinking ahead to the November 2010 elections, what general issues are most important to you as you decide how you will vote? [What general issues were most important to you as you decided how you would vote?]

A separate variable is used for each issue (Education, Health Care, Taxes, and Economy). For each variable, 1 for those who stated the issue was most important, 0 otherwise.

Government Approval

Now I’m going to read you a list of names of public officials and public organizations, and for each one, I want you to tell me whether you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or strongly unfavorable view of that person or organization. [List is randomized.] How about the state legislature in Olympia? Do you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or strongly unfavorable view of the state legislature in Olympia?

4 for very favorable, 3 for somewhat favorable, 2 for somewhat unfavorable, and 1 for strongly unfavorable.

Liberal

When it comes to politics, do you usually think of yourself as a Liberal, a Conservative, a Moderate, or haven’t you thought much about this?

1 for Liberal, 0 otherwise.

Conservative

When it comes to politics, do you usually think of yourself as a Liberal, a Conservative, a Moderate, or haven’t you thought much about this?

1 for Conservative, 0 otherwise.

Education

What is the highest level of education you completed? Just stop me when I read the correct category—Grades 1–8, some high school, high school graduate, some college or technical school, college graduate, or post-graduate.

4 for post-graduate, 3 for college graduate, 2 for some college or technical school, and 1 for high school graduate or less.

Age

In what year were you born?

Age in years calculated from response.

Male

[Not asked; coded by interviewer.]

1 for male, 0 for female.

Homeowner

Do you currently own or rent your home?

1 for own, 0 otherwise.

Table B.7. Logistic Regression Models of Support for Proposition 1098 (Taxes on the Wealthy)

Income Binary

Income 3 Categories

Income 5 Categories

b

(se)

b

(se)

b

(se)

Inequality is Bad

0.835***

(0.248)

0.873***

(0.249)

0.830***

(0.251)

Income: 2 Category

Less than $60k

0.604*

(0.260)

$60k+ (reference)

Income: 3 Category

Less than $40k

0.602*

(0.295)

$40−$100k (reference)

$100k+

0.101

(0.267)

Income: 5 Category

Less than $40k

0.937*

(0.401)

$40−$60k

0.652

(0.409)

$60−$80k (reference)

$80−$100k

0.068

(0.436)

$100k+

0.362

(0.367)

Income missing

−0.425

(0.318)

−0.522

(0.317)

−0.216

(0.415)

Party Identification

0.651***

(0.148)

0.665***

(0.147)

0.661***

(0.149)

Attention to 1098

−0.530*

(0.217)

−0.541*

(0.217)

−0.531*

(0.218)

Issue: Education

0.772+

(0.437)

0.721+

(0.436)

0.836+

(0.446)

Issue: Health Care

0.023

(0.362)

0.031

(0.364)

0.024

(0.365)

Issue: Taxes

−1.288***

(0.297)

−1.259***

(0.295)

−1.302***

(0.298)

Issue: Economy

0.467+

(0.282)

0.505+

(0.285)

0.505+

(0.287)

Government Approval

0.366***

(0.090)

0.365***

(0.090)

0.366***

(0.091)

Liberal

0.669**

(0.253)

0.679**

(0.253)

0.668**

(0.254)

Conservative

−0.733*

(0.299)

−0.679*

(0.299)

−0.712*

(0.302)

Education

0.280*

(0.116)

0.239*

(0.115)

0.274*

(0.117)

Age

−0.014+

(0.007)

−0.011

(0.007)

−0.013+

(0.007)

Male

−0.859***

(0.211)

−0.893***

(0.210)

−0.869***

(0.211)

Homeowner

−0.075

(0.286)

−0.096

(0.290)

−0.036

(0.294)

Constant

−2.489***

(0.669)

−2.483***

(0.675)

−2.749***

(0.706)

N

733

733

733

Log-Likelihood

−317.333

−317.943

−316.344

Pseudo R2

0.374

0.373

0.376

(+) p < .10,

(*) p < .05,

(**) p < .01,

(***) p < .001.

Table B.8. Logistic Regression Model of Support for Proposition 1098, Conditional on Attention to Ballot Measure

Conditional Model: Attention

b

(se)

Inequality is Bad

0.942**

(0.321)

Income: Less than $60k

0.519+

(0.311)

Income: $60k+ (reference)

Income missing

−0.445

(0.326)

Party Identification

0.186

(0.181)

Attention to 1098

−3.185***

(0.768)

Inequality is Bad × Attention

−0.403

(0.539)

Income: Less than $60k × Attention

−0.103

(0.451)

Party ID × Attention

1.242***

(0.298)

Issue: Education

0.631

(0.440)

Issue: Health Care

−0.005

(0.369)

Issue: Taxes

−1.275***

(0.304)

Issue: Economy

0.441

(0.290)

Government Approval

0.346***

(0.093)

Liberal

0.680**

(0.256)

Conservative

−0.974**

(0.320)

Education

0.277*

(0.118)

Age

−0.011

(0.007)

Male

−0.913***

(0.217)

Homeowner

−0.111

(0.285)

Constant

−1.458*

(0.730)

N

733.000

Log-Likelihood

−306.657

Pseudo R2

0.395

(+) p < 0.10,

(*) p < 0.05,

(**) p < 0.01,

(***) p < 0.001.

Table B.9. Logistic Regression Models of Support for Proposition 1098, Conditional on Party Identification

Cond. Model (1): Party ID

Cond. Model (2): Party ID

b

(se)

b

(se)

Inequality is Bad

−0.136

(0.601)

0.847**

(0.257)

Income: Less than $60k

0.934

(0.585)

0.692**

(0.267)

Income missing

−0.476

(0.330)

−0.345

(0.337)

Party Identification

−0.075

(0.292)

0.338+

(0.178)

Attention to 1098

−3.344***

(0.736)

−0.555*

(0.222)

Inequality is Bad × Party ID

0.483+

(0.281)

Income: Less $60k × Party ID

−0.202

(0.234)

Attention × Party ID

1.186***

(0.279)

Issue: Education

0.659

(0.441)

1.421

(1.033)

Issue: Health Care

−0.050

(0.367)

−0.450

(1.011)

Issue: Taxes

−1.340***

(0.303)

−3.861**

(1.245)

Issue: Economy

0.454

(0.292)

−3.179**

(1.009)

Education × Party ID

−0.347

(0.437)

Health Care × Party ID

0.214

(0.402)

Taxes × Party ID

1.037*

(0.450)

Economy × Party ID

1.641***

(0.412)

Government Approval

0.351***

(0.093)

0.391***

(0.094)

Liberal

0.622*

(0.254)

0.659*

(0.257)

Conservative

−1.024**

(0.319)

−0.663*

(0.313)

Education

0.236*

(0.118)

0.326**

(0.119)

Age

−0.013+

(0.007)

−0.015*

(0.007)

Male

−0.982***

(0.221)

−0.840***

(0.215)

Homeowner

−0.049

(0.285)

−0.085

(0.294)

Constant

−0.748

(0.844)

−1.949**

(0.724)

N

733

733

Log-Likelihood

−305.119

−303.593

Pseudo R2

0.398

0.401

(+) p < .10,

(*) p < .05,

(**) p < .01,

(***) p < .001.

Table B.10. Regression Models of Average Top Income Tax Rates in the States Between 1987 and 2012

State Top Income Tax

b

(se)

Awareness of Inequality

0.780*

(0.377)

Public Mood

0.242

(0.191)

State Government Ideology

0.000

(0.036)

Union Membership

−0.115

(0.095)

Initiative Qualification Index

0.123

(0.179)

% White

13.736*

(6.390)

Constant

−71.394*

(32.330)

N

48.000

Log-Likelihood

−111.229

R2

0.191

+ p < .10,

(*) p < .05,

** p < .01,

*** p < .001.

Table B.11. Effect of State Characteristics on State Minimum Wage Laws

Δ‎ State Minimum Wage

b

se

b

se

State Minimum Waget−1

−0.165***

(0.017)

−0.164***

(0.017)

Δ‎ Awareness of Inequality

0.006+

(0.003)

0.006+

(0.003)

Awareness of Inequality

0.011***

(0.003)

0.011***

(0.003)

Δ‎ Public Mood

0.017***

(0.003)

0.016***

(0.003)

Public Mood

0.003+

(0.002)

0.003+

(0.002)

Δ‎ Union Membership

0.008

(0.007)

0.008

(0.007)

Union Membershipt−1

0.000

(0.001)

0.000

(0.001)

Δ‎ Government Ideology

0.002*

(0.001)

0.002*

(0.001)

Government Ideology

0.001**

(0.000)

0.001**

(0.000)

Initiative Qualification Index

0.009**

(0.003)

0.000

(0.005)

Δ‎ Poverty Rate

−0.001

(0.004)

−0.001

(0.004)

Poverty Rate

−0.003

(0.002)

−0.003

(0.002)

Δ‎ % White

−2.923

(1.907)

−2.810

(1.903)

% White

0.203*

(0.086)

0.200*

(0.086)

Has State EITC

0.006

(0.017)

0.005

(0.017)

Federal Minimum Wage Change

−0.038*

(0.018)

−0.038*

(0.018)

Years Since Federal Change

0.025***

(0.004)

0.021***

(0.004)

Initiative × Years Since Fed. Change

0.002*

(0.001)

Constant

−2.095***

(0.297)

−2.061***

(0.297)

N

1152

1152

Log-Likelihood

462.113

469.165

(+) p < .10,

(*) p < .05,

(**) p < .01,

(***) p < .001.

Note: Each model includes a set of time variables estimating a second- or third-order polynomial to account for any remaining trend in the first-differenced dependent variable (these estimates are not included in the table).

Table B.12. Effect of State Characteristics on State Earned Income Tax Credit Adoption

State EITC Adoption

(1) b / (rob. se)

(2) b / (rob. se)

(3) b / (rob. se)

Δ‎ Awareness of Inequality

0.265**

0.269**

0.269**

(0.091)

(0.090)

(0.091)

Union Membership

0.119*

0.110*

0.110*

(0.049)

(0.048)

(0.050)

Public Mood

0.002

−0.002

(0.060)

(0.059)

Government Ideology

0.020

0.020

(0.014)

(0.014)

Initiative Qualification Index

−0.172

−0.134

−0.134

(0.120)

(0.111)

(0.116)

Poverty Rate

−0.229*

−0.277**

−0.277**

(0.094)

(0.102)

(0.104)

% Income Tax Revenue

0.066**

0.065**

0.065**

(0.023)

(0.020)

(0.020)

% White

0.955

1.137

1.103

(4.013)

(3.361)

(3.897)

State Min. Wage Above Fed.

0.318

−0.110

−0.107

(0.685)

(0.773)

(0.783)

Total State EITC Adoptions

0.559*

0.563*

0.565*

(0.267)

(0.270)

(0.275)

Regional Diffusion

−1.901

−1.916+

−1.910+

(1.200)

(1.133)

(1.158)

Constant

−6.357

−7.099+

−6.981

(6.702)

(4.219)

(6.405)

N

881.000

881.000

881.000

Log-Likelihood

−83.314

−82.215

−82.215

(+) p < .10,

(*) p < .05,

(**) p < .01,

*** p < .001.

(p.192) (p.191) (p.190) (p.189) (p.188) (p.187) (p.186) (p.185) (p.193) (p.202) (p.201) (p.200) (p.199) (p.198) (p.197) (p.196) (p.195) (p.194)