This chapter contrasts the February 2011 coup in Egypt against Hosni Mubarak with the July 2013 coup against Mohamed Morsi. Although the two coups were of different kinds—one deposed a dictator and the other a democratically elected leader—the motivations of the coup leaders were similar. In both cases the military took advantage of popular uprisings to depose leaders who threatened its interests. The Muslim Brotherhood, the once humble partner of the Egyptian military, had turned into an ambitious and opportunistic opponent. It was positioned to pose a significant threat to the military, as demonstrated by Morsi’s purge of the military’s senior leadership with impunity. In response the military took advantage of the massive uprising against Morsi and deposed him.
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.