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On What MattersVolume Two$
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Derek Parfit

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199572816

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199572816.001.0001

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Metaphysics

Metaphysics

Chapter:
(p.464) 31 Metaphysics
Source:
On What Matters
Author(s):

Samuel Scheffler

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199572816.003.0019

This chapter relates metaphysics and ontology with Non-Metaphysical Cognitivism. If some things matter, then there are some irreducibly normative truths. This notion is denied by Allan Gibbard and other proponents of Metaphysical Naturalism who believe that all properties and facts must be natural properties and facts, and that irreducibly normative truths are incompatible with a scientific world-view. When we consider either morality or practical and epistemic reasons, there are several fundamental questions that we haven't answered. Some of these questions are about normativity while others are wider questions about the nature and status of necessary truths. This chapter also examines Possibilism and Non-Metaphysical Non-Naturalist Normative Cognitivism, or Rationalism.

Keywords:   metaphysics, ontology, Non-Metaphysical Cognitivism, normative truths, Allan Gibbard, Metaphysical Naturalism, normativity, Possibilism, Rationalism

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