This chapter relates metaphysics and ontology with Non-Metaphysical Cognitivism. If some things matter, then there are some irreducibly normative truths. This notion is denied by Allan Gibbard and other proponents of Metaphysical Naturalism who believe that all properties and facts must be natural properties and facts, and that irreducibly normative truths are incompatible with a scientific world-view. When we consider either morality or practical and epistemic reasons, there are several fundamental questions that we haven't answered. Some of these questions are about normativity while others are wider questions about the nature and status of necessary truths. This chapter also examines Possibilism and Non-Metaphysical Non-Naturalist Normative Cognitivism, or Rationalism.
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