Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
On What MattersVolume Two$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Derek Parfit

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199572816

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199572816.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 21 September 2018

Naturalism and Nihilism

Naturalism and Nihilism

Chapter:
(p.357) 27 Naturalism and Nihilism
Source:
On What Matters
Author(s):

Samuel Scheffler

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199572816.003.0015

This chapter looks in detail at Naturalism and Nihilism, first by applying the Triviality Objection to Non-Analytical Naturalism about reasons. If normativity is best conceived as involving reasons or apparent reasons, the main question is whether facts about reasons might be natural facts. And the Triviality Objection takes a simpler, clearer form. In his defence of Subjectivism, Mark Schroeder claims that when some fact explains why some act would fulfil one of our present desires, this fact is a reason for us to act in this way. The chapter also explains natural facts based on two opposing views, Soft Naturalism and Hard Naturalism, along with the Soft Naturalist's Dilemma and its Further Information version.

Keywords:   reasons, Naturalism, Nihilism, Triviality Objection, Non-Analytical Naturalism, normativity, natural facts, Soft Naturalism, Hard Naturalism, Soft Naturalist's Dilemma

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .