Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
On What MattersVolume Two$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Derek Parfit

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199572816

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199572816.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2017. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 20 April 2018

The Triviality Objection

The Triviality Objection

Chapter:
(p.328) 26 The Triviality Objection
Source:
On What Matters
Author(s):

Samuel Scheffler

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199572816.003.0014

This chapter is about Triviality Objection. It first examines normative concepts and natural properties, including the concept of the natural property that makes acts right and the concept of being blameworthy. It then considers the Naturalists' use of analogies with scientific discoveries, such as the discovery that water is H2O or that heat is molecular kinetic energy, and argues that such analogies partly fail. It also tackles the Non-Analytical Naturalism belief that any true normative claim states some fact that is both normative and natural. If this fact were natural, it could also be stated by some non-normative claim. If these claims stated the same fact, they would give us the same information. Such claims could not state facts that are both normative and natural. When we say that we ought to act in some way, we are making a substantive claim, which might state a positive substantive normative fact. If these forms of Naturalism were true, such claims would not be substantive, but would be trivial. So these forms of Naturalism cannot be true.

Keywords:   normative concepts, Triviality Objection, natural properties, scientific discoveries, Non-Analytical Naturalism, Naturalism

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .