This chapter presents Non-Analytical Naturalism. According to Non-Analytical Naturalists, we use some words to express concepts and make claims that are irreducibly normative, in the sense that these concepts and claims cannot be defined or restated in non-normative terms. When we turn to facts, however, there is no such deep distinction. All facts are natural, but some of these facts are also normative, since we can also state these facts by making irreducibly normative claims. Most of these Naturalists make claims that are not about reasons, but about morality. This chapter examines such claims, with particular emphasis on Normative Naturalism, Metaphysical Naturalism, Moral Naturalism, and the Co-extensiveness Argument. It also considers whether, as Non-Analytical Naturalists believe, irreducibly normative claims might state natural facts.
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.