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The World in the Head$
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Robert Cummins

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199548033

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199548033.001.0001

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Methodological Reflections on Belief

Methodological Reflections on Belief

(p.67) 5 Methodological Reflections on Belief
The World in the Head

Robert Cummins

Oxford University Press

This chapter analyses intentional realism and the philosophy of science, followed by a description of belief attributions. It focuses on Fred Dretske's theory, which implies that mental states get representational content during a learning period when mentality becomes perfect indicators of the properties they represent. Fred Dretske's theory runs the risk that no mental states have representational content compared to a deed, indicating that no mental state is a perfect indicator of states of affairs. The chapter concludes with a review of folk psychology, which explains the concepts and implications of folk psychology once proven true and explanatory.

Keywords:   intentional realism, belief attributions, Fred Dretske, mentality, mental states, representational content, folk psychology

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