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The World in the Head$
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Robert Cummins

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199548033

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199548033.001.0001

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The LOT of the Causal Theory of Mental Content

The LOT of the Causal Theory of Mental Content

Chapter:
(p.11) 2 The LOT of the Causal Theory of Mental Content
Source:
The World in the Head
Author(s):

Robert Cummins

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199548033.003.0002

This chapter talks about the causal theory of mental content (CT), which is incompatible with an elementary fact of perceptual psychology called the nontransducibility of distal properties (NTDP). It focuses on two stages of arguments. The first stage implies that the conjunction of CT and the language of thought hypothesis (LOT) are conflicting with NTDP, while the second stage indicates that the acceptance of CT requires acceptance of LOT. Since distal properties are not transducible and the argument uses only a generic form of CT, CT is considered false in all forms.

Keywords:   causal theory of mental content, CT, nontransducibility of distal properties, NTDP, language of thought hypothesis, LOT, perceptual psychology

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