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The World in the Head$
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Robert Cummins

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199548033

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199548033.001.0001

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Meaning and Content in Cognitive Science

Meaning and Content in Cognitive Science

Chapter:
(p.174) 11 Meaning and Content in Cognitive Science
Source:
The World in the Head
Author(s):

Robert Cummins

Martin Roth

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199548033.003.0011

This chapter describes the prospects for a cognitive science of ‘meaning’ and ‘content’. It considers ‘meaning’ as a property of linguistic expressions or acts, while ‘content’ is described as a property of mental representations and indicator signals. The chapter concludes with explanations for reasons why it is dangerous to think of contents developed by representations and indicator signals as ‘meanings’. One reason suggests that a theory of content is a semantics for content, implying that representations and indicator signals required by cognitive science don't have logical forms and are not candidates for truth-conditional semantics.

Keywords:   cognitive science, meaning, content, linguistic expressions, mental representations, indicator signals, theory of content, truth-conditional semantics

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