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Michael Jubien

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780199232789

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199232789.001.0001

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Against Possible Worlds

Against Possible Worlds

(p.58) (p.59) 3 Against Possible Worlds

Michael Jubien

Oxford University Press

As a prerequisite to the subject of the metaphysical concepts of possibility and necessity, this chapter explores David Lewis' theory of possible worlds, which is of a modal realist stance. This means that there exist other possible worlds aside from the actual one, and Lewis believes that these possible worlds are not different in kind from the actual world. The chapter however disagrees with that standpoint and argues that Lewis' theory is loaded with ‘persuasive terminology’, and that the existence of so-called detached realms is more probable, only dispersed portions of the actual world and not entire worlds at all. It also discusses how philosophers come up with theories about the world through modal logic, citing Saul Kripke's propositional model structure.

Keywords:   David Lewis, possible worlds, actual world, modal realism, modal logic, Saul Kripke

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