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Defending Democratic NormsInternational Actors and the Politics of Electoral Misconduct$

Daniela Donno

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199991280

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199991280.001.0001

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(p.205) (p.206) APPENDIX C Statistical Appendix to Chapter 5

(p.205) (p.206) APPENDIX C Statistical Appendix to Chapter 5

Source:
Defending Democratic Norms
Publisher:
Oxford University Press

(p.207) (p.208)

C.1. EFFECT OF REGIONAL IGO ENFORCEMENT

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

DV: Change in Intensity of Flaws

DV: Change in Elec. Obs. Verdict

DV: Postelection Concessions

DV: Alternation

Postelection, Previous Election: Regl. IGO Conditionality

0.57* (0.05)

0.42 (0.10)

Regl. IGO Diplomatic Engagement

0.31 (0.11)

0.29+ (0.08)

Pre-election: Regl. IGO Conditionality

0.21 (0.33)

0.01 (0.95)

1.43** (0.00)

Regl. IGO Diplomatic Engagement

-0.36* (0.03)

-0.24 (0.18)

-0.47 (0.24)

Postelection: Regl. IGO Conditionality

-0.37 (0.47)

-0.72 (0.22)

Regl. IGO Diplomatic Engagement

1.35** (0.00)

-3.69** (0.00)

Postelection Opposition Protests

1.16** (0.00)

0.64+ (0.07)

Regl. IGO Dip. Engt.* Protests

5.66** (0.00)

Postelection Enforcement, Previous Election

-0.08 (0.60)

-0.02 (0.81)

Pre-election Enforcement

0.05 (0.71)

0.03 (0.78)

-0.23 (0.47)

Postelection Enforcement

-0.05 (0.91)

0.15 (0.67)

Election Observers Present

0.42 (0.22)

Election Observer Criticism

-0.07 (0.84)

-0.04 (0.90)

Election Observer Criticism, Previous Election

-0.27+ (0.05)

0.55** (0.00)

Opposition Coalition

-0.26+ (0.08)

0.05 (0.66)

0.13 (0.63)

Incumbent Running

0.01 (0.91)

0.07 (0.46)

-0.54+ (0.08)

-0.79* (0.04)

-0.62* (0.04)

Intensity of Flaws

0.13 (0.47)

0.09 (0.65)

-0.36* (0.02)

Intensity of Flaws, Previous Election

1.01** (0.00)

0.12* (0.05)

No. Previously Flawed Elections

-015* (0.03)

-0.01 (0.86)

Polity, t-1

0.04 ((0.22)

-0.02 (0.48)

0.03 (0.26)

0.04 (0.20)

0.13** (0.00)

Prior Liberalization

-0.03 (0.13)

0.03* (0.05)

-0.02 (0.53)

-0.00 (0.97)

0.01 (0.75)

Democ. in the Region, t-1

0.14+ (0.05)

0.04 (0.35)

0.01 (0.86)

0.01 (0.90)

-0.00 (0.96)

No. Densely Democratic IGOS, t-1

0.04* (0.03)

-0.00 (0.69)

-0.03 (0.31)

-0.04 (0.27)

0.00 (0.89)

Regional Democratic Commitments, t-1

-0.13 (0.31)

0.02 (0.85)

-0.27 (0.18)

-0.30 (0.14)

-0.33* (0.04)

GDP Change, t-1

-0.02 (0.25)

-0.03 (0.13)

-0.04** (0.01)

Main Election

0.83* (0.00)

Constant

-0.99** (0.00)

-0.54** (0.00)

-2.19** (0.00)

-1.86** (0.00)

-0.85* (0.03)

Observations R-squared

304 0.45

303 0.23

263

263

216

Models 1–2 are OLS models with country fixed effects and clustered standard errors. Models 3–5 are probit models with robust standard errors clustered on country. “t-1” denotes a one-year lag. Sample = Models 1 and 2: elections following a flawed election. Models 3–4: flawed elections won by the incumbent. Model 5: elections that follow a flawed election won by the incumbent.

Robust p values in parentheses

+ = significant at 10%; * = significant at 5%; ** = significant at 1%

(p.209) (p.210) (p.211)

C.2. EFFECT OF EU ENFORCEMENT OUTSIDE EUROPE AND POSTCOMMUNIST REGION

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

DV: Change in Intensity of Flaws

DV: Change in Elec. Obs. Verdict

DV: Postelection Concessions

DV: Alternation

Postelection, Previous Election: EU Conditionality

0.46 (0.13)

0.11 (0.61)

EU Diplomatic Engagement

-0.20 (0.37)

-0.11 (0.54)

Pre-election: EU Conditionality

0.64 (0.11)

0.10 (0.59)

-0.04 (0.96)

EU Diplomatic Engagement

-0.26 (0.21)

-0.24 (0.22)

0.25 (0.59)

Postelection: EU Conditionality

0.13 (0.78)

0.09 (0.85)

EU Diplomatic Engagement

-0.46 (0.21)

-3.72** (0.00)

Postelection Opposition Protests

1.16** (0.00)

1.12** (0.00)

Regl. IGO Dip. Engt. * Protests

3.40** (0.00)

Postelection Enforcement, Previous Election

0.02 (0.88)

0.12 (0.29)

Pre-election Enforcement

-0.06 (0.65)

-0.03 (0.81)

-0.17 (0.56)

Postelection Enforcement

0.48+ (0.10)

0.50+ (0.08)

Election Observers Present

0.35 (0.27)

Election Observer Criticism

-0.09 (0.78)

-0.07 (0.81)

Election Observer Criticism, Previous Election

-0.28+ (0.07)

0.55** (0.00)

Opposition Coalition

-0.35* (0.02)

0.02 (0.84)

0.25 (0.32)

Incumbent Running

0.01 (0.93)

0.05 (0.59)

-0.16 (0.55)

-0.18 (0.53)

-0.67* (0.02)

Intensity of Flaws

0.10 (0.59)

0.09 (0.63)

-0.31* (0.02)

Intensity of Flaws, Previous Election

1.03** (0.00)

0.11 (0.12)

No. Previously Flawed Elections

-0.09 (0.18)

0.03 (0.29)

Polity, t-1

0.03 (0.31)

-0.03 (0.37)

0.02 (0.42)

0.02 (0.45)

0.12** (0.00)

Prior Liberalization

-0.02 (0.12)

0.03+ (0.05)

-0.02 (0.62)

-0.02 (0.57)

0.02 (0.63)

Democ. in the Region, t-1

0.13+ (0.09)

0.04 (0.37)

0.00 (0.95)

0.00 (0.94)

0.00 (0.92)

No. Densely Democratic IGOs, t-1

0.03+ (0.09)

-0.01 (0.38)

-0.02 (0.47)

-0.02 (0.47)

-0.00 (0.86)

Regional Democratic Commitments, t-1

-0.12 (0.37)

0.02 (0.82)

-0.02 (0.88)

-0.02 (0.90)

-0.24 (0.10)

GDP Change, t-1

-0.02 (0.36)

-0.02 (0.35)

-0.03* (0.01)

Main Election

0.81** (0.00)

Constant

-1.12** (0.00)

-0.59** (0.00)

-2.41** (0.00)

-2.37** (0.00)

-0.90* (0.01)

Observations

304

303

264

264

216

R-squared

0.44

0.20

Models 1–2 are OLS models with country fixed effects and clustered standard errors. Models 3–5 are probit models with robust standard errors clustered on country. “t-1” denotes a one-year lag. Sample = Models 1 and 2: elections following a flawed election. Models 3–4: flawed elections won by the incumbent. Model 5: elections that follow a flawed election won by the incumbent.

Robust p values in parentheses

+ = significant at 10%; * = significant at 5%; ** = significant at 1%

(p.212) (p.213) (p.214)

C.3. EFFECT OF US ENFORCEMENT

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

DV: Change in Intensity of Flaws

DV: Change in Elec. Obs. Verdict

DV: Postelection Concessions

DV: Alternation

Postelection, Previous Election: US Conditionality US Diplomatic Engagement

-0.92+ (0.06) 0.20 (0.32)

-0.33 (0.28) 0.26* (0.05)

Pre-election: US Conditionality US Diplomatic Engagement

0.23 (0.20) -0.27 (0.11)

0.21 (0.16) -0.07 (0.66)

-0.19 (0.71) -0.01 (0.97)

Post-election:

US Conditionality US Diplomatic Engagement

0.43 (0.46) 5.35** (0.00)

0.30 (0.66) 0.31 (0.59)

Postelection Opposition Protests

1.19** (0.00)

0.24 (0.66)

Regl. IGO Dip. Engt. * Protests

5.43** (0.00)

Postelection Enforcement, Previous Election

-0.03 (0.86)

-0.04 (0.77)

Pre-election Enforcement

0.07 (0.66)

-0.05 (0.74)

-0.08 (0.79)

Postelection Enforcement

-4.57** (0.00)

-4.01** (0.00)

Election Observers Present

0.34 (0.30)

Election Observer Criticism

-0.19 (0.58)

-0.15 (0.67)

Election Observer Criticism, Previous

-0.29* (0.05)

0.53** (0.00)

Election Opposition Coalition

-0.29+ (0.07)

0.00 (0.99)

0.27 (0.32)

Incumbent Running

0.03 (0.77)

0.08 (0.41)

-0.14 (0.68)

-0.22 (0.56)

-0.66* (0.02)

Intensity of Flaws

0.03 (0.90)

-0.05 (0.82)

-0.30* (0.02)

Intensity of Flaws, Previous Election

1.04** (0.00)

0.12+ (0.07)

No. Previously Flawed Elections

-0.10 (0.11)

0.03 (0.37)

Polity, t-1

0.03 (0.33)

-0.03 (0.36)

0.03 (0.44)

0.05 (0.20)

0.12** (0.00)

Prior Liberalization

-0.01 (0.38)

0.04* (0.01)

-0.01 (0.69)

-0.00 (0.99)

0.02 (0.68)

Democ. in the Region, t-1

0.14+ (0.06)

0.04 (0.37)

0.00 (0.99)

-0.01 (0.81)

0.01 (0.89)

No. Densely Democratic IG0s, t-1

0.03+ (0.08)

-0.01 (0.40)

-0.05 (0.16)

-0.05 (0.18)

-0.01 (0.74)

Regional Democratic Commitments, t-1

-0.11 (0.40)

0.04 (0.66)

0.05 (0.78)

0.02 (0.93)

-0.24 (0.11)

GDP Change, t-1

-0.03

-0.03+

-0.03*

Main Election

(0.28)

(0.10)

(0.01) 0.79** (0.00)

Constant

-1.14** (0.00)

-0.61** (0.00)

-2.26** (0.00)

-1.79** (0.00)

-0.87* (0.02)

Observations

304

303

263

263

216

R-squared

0.42

0.20

Models 1–2 are OLS models with country fixed effects and clustered standard errors. Models 3–5 are probit models with robust standard errors clustered on country. “t-1” denotes a one-year lag. Sample = Models 1 and 2: elections following a flawed election. Models 3–4: flawed elections won by the incumbent. Model 5: elections that follow a flawed election won by the incumbent.

Robust p values in parentheses

+ = significant at 10%; * = significant at 5%; ** = significant at 1%

(p.215) (p.216) (p.217)

C.4. EFFECT OF UN ENFORCEMENT

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

DV: Change in Intensity of Flaws

DV: Change in Elec. Obs. Verdict

DV: Postelection Concessions

DV: Alternation

Postelection, Previous Election: UN Diplomatic Engagement

-0.14 (0.61)

-0.31 (0.12)

Pre-election: UN Conditionality

1.39** (0.00)

-0.17 (0.66)

UN Diplomatic Engagement

0.12 (0.60)

0.52** (0.01)

-0.08 (0.84)

Post-Election: UN Diplomatic Engagement

0.81 (0.10)

-3.60** (0.00)

Postelection Opposition Protests

1.22** (0.00)

1.08** (0.00)

Regl. IGO Dip. Engt. * Protests

4.71** (0.00)

Postelection Enforcement, Previous Election

0.08 (0.55)

0.15 (0.15)

Pre-election Enforcement

-0.13 (0.34)

-0.19 (0.12)

-0.07 (0.79)

Postelection Enforcement

0.23 (0.45)

0.26 (0.36)

Election Observers Present

0.35 (0.28)

Election Observer Criticism

-0.07 (0.83)

0.03 (0.93)

Election Observer Criticism, Previous Election

-0.30* (0.04)

0.54** (0.00)

Opposition Coalition

-0.30+ (0.05)

0.02 (0.89)

0.26 (0.32)

Incumbent Running

0.01 (0.91)

0.06 (0.52)

-0.30 (0.26)

-0.38 (0.15)

-0.65* (0.02)

Intensity of Flaws

0.11 (0.58)

0.09 (0.63)

-0.32* (0.02)

Intensity of Flaws, Previous Election

1.04** (0.00)

0.15* (0.03)

No. Previously Flawed Elections

-0.10 (0.13)

0.03 (0.44)

Polity, t-1

0.02 (0.54)

-0.03 (0.21)

0.01 (0.73)

0.01 (0.71)

0.11** (0.00)

Prior Liberalization

-0.01 (0.43)

0.04** (0.01)

-0.04 (0.25)

-0.03 (0.48)

0.02 (0.66)

Democ. in the Region, t-1

0.13+ (0.08)

0.04 (0.44)

0.02 (0.68)

0.02 (0.55)

0.01 (0.87)

No. Densely Democratic IG0s, t-1

0.04+ (0.07)

-0.01 (0.67)

-0.01 (0.73)

-0.01 (0.72)

-0.01 (0.75)

Regional Democratic Commitments, t-1

-0.11 (0.45)

0.04 (0.65)

0.03 (0.86)

0.00 (0.98)

-0.24 (0.11)

GDP Change, t-1

-0.01 (0.68)

-0.01 (0.83)

-0.03* (0.02)

Main Election

0.77** (0.00)

Constant

-1.10** (0.00)

-0.66** (0.00)

-2.49** (0.00)

-2.43** (0.00)

-0.86* (0.02)

Observations

304

303

259

259

213

R-squared

0.43

0.23

The very few instances of UN postelection conditionality caused these variables to drop from the models. “t-1” denotes a one-year lag. Models 1–2 are OLS models with country fixed effects and clustered standard errors. Models 3–5 are probit models with robust standard errors clustered on country. Sample = Models 1 and 2: elections following a flawed election. Models 3–4: flawed elections won by the incumbent. Model 5: elections that follow a flawed election won by the incumbent.

Robust p values in parentheses

+ = significant at 10%; * = significant at 5%; ** = significant at 1%

(p.218) (p.219)

C.5. SELECTION MODELS: EFFECT OF POSTELECTION ENFORCEMENT ON ELECTORAL CONDUCT

(1)

(2)

Selection: Postelection Conditionality, previous elec.

DV: Change in Intensity of Flaws

Selection: Postelection Dipl. Engt., Prev. Election

DV: Change in Intensity of Flaws

Postelection Conditionality, Previous Election

1.21** (0.00)

0.22 (0.19)

Postelection Diplomatic Engagement, Previous Election

-0.20+ (0.09)

0.77* (0.01)

Pre-election Enforcement

-0.12 (0.25)

-0.11 (0.32)

Election Observer Criticism, Previous Election

-0.24 (0.27)

-0.13 (0.29)

0.70** (0.00)

-0.36** (0.01)

Opposition Coalition

-0.26+ (0.07)

-0.28+ (0.06)

Intensity of Flaws, Previous Election

0.77** (0.00)

0.76** (0.00)

No. Previously Flawed Elections

-0.14** (0.00)

-0.17** (0.00)

No. Previously Flawed Elections, Previous Election

0.26** (0.00)

0.25** (0.00)

Democracy in the Region, t-1

0.04* (0.02)

0.04* (0.03)

No. Densely Democratic IG0s, t-1

0.02** (0.01)

0.02* (0.02)

Regional Democratic Commitments, t-1

-0.17* (0.01)

-0.13+ (0.05)

Military Expenditures (log), Previous Election

-0.18** (0.00)

-0.08* (0.02)

No. Membership in IGOs with Enforcement Mechanisms

0.32* (0.03)

-0.02 (0.88)

ρ (rho)

-0.66** (0.00)

-0.63** (0.01)

Constant

1.38+ (0.08)

-0.31* (0.04)

0.06 (0.93)

-0.27+ (0.10)

Observations

274

274

274

274

Treatment-effects selection models with robust standard errors clustered on country. “t-1” denotes a one-year lag. Sample = elections following a flawed election. Robust p values in parentheses

+ = significant at 10%; * = significant at 5%; ** = significant at 1%