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Who Owns the World's Media?Media Concentration and Ownership around the World$

Eli M. Noam and The International Media Concentration Collaboration

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780199987238

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199987238.001.0001

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Media Ownership and Concentration in India

Media Ownership and Concentration in India

Chapter:
(p.772) 25 Media Ownership and Concentration in India
Source:
Who Owns the World's Media?
Author(s):

Anuradha Bhattacharjee

Liwei Wang

Tapasya Banerjee

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199987238.003.0025

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter examines media ownership and concentration in India. Following an overview of the Indian media landscape, the remainder of the chapter focuses on print media (newspapers, book publishing, and magazine publishing), audiovisual media (radio, broadcast television, multichannel TV platforms, video channels, and film), telecommunications media (wireline and wireless telecom), and Internet media (Internet Service Providers, search engines, and online news market). The most significant area of growth for Indian media markets has been in the provision of vernacular language content. Concentration is increasing in the rapidly expanding and diversifying telecommunications and pay TV markets, but not in the print media market. The wireless telecom market has a strong presence of the large industrial conglomerates Bharti, Reliance, and Tata, which reduced the role of the wireline state incumbent BSNL. A similar evolution has taken place for television, where the role of the state-run Presar Bharti has declined due to the entry of Zee Entertainment, Sun group, and DEN Networks. In the print media, major firms are BCCL

Keywords:   Indian media market, media industry, media groups, print media, online news market, telecommunications, Internet, Zee, DEN, Presar Bharti, Tata, Reliance, Bharti, BSNL

Introduction

The Indian media market is greatly affected by the country’s geographical size, the seventh largest in the world by land area, and demographics. India’s 28 states and seven union territories were originally created on a linguistic basis, and there are 22 “recognized” languages in India, including the official national languages of English and Hindi. Most Indians are fluent in at least two languages, including English, and have a preferred vernacular language for media consumption. Such vernacular media outlets play a key role in the politics of the states and union territories.1

Historically, most Indian mass media outlets have been state-owned, with the exception of newspapers, magazines, and film studios. Liberalization of the media market really only began in 2001, when private enterprises were finally licensed to operate in the audiovisual and telecommunications sectors.2 Substantial restrictions on foreign direct investment (FDI) remain in place, however: 100% FDI is allowed only for the film industry and online media, while there are caps for telecommunications and print media (74%), cable and satellite television (49%), and radio broadcasting (20%).3 The (p.773) most restrictive measures affect the radio and terrestrial TV markets: the state-run All India Radio (AIR) monopolizes news broadcasting. Though privately owned Indian television networks are allowed to broadcast news content, foreign investment in such networks is highly restricted with a 26% cap.

Due to the legacy of state control over many media producers, these enterprises indulge in rent-seeking behavior due to the importance of political and familial patronage in politics.4 It is estimated that one-third of all news channels and 60% of all cable distributors are owned by politicians and political activists (or their relatives).5, 6 Politicians who own cable operators or newspapers—either directly, or indirectly through patronage networks—use undeclared revenue from these operations to fund their election campaigns.7 Industrial conglomerates also practice rent-seeking, though they do so not to raise funds, as their other holdings are used to subsidize their often unprofitable media properties.8 Instead, they hope to use the media properties to pressure politicians and head off negative reporting concerning their business practices. What this entrails was illustrated in a dispute between Jindal Steel and Power Limited (JSPL) and the Zee media group. JSPL accused Zee of extortion: the network was videotaped as it allegedly proposed an US$2 million (INR100 million) advertising deal to JSPL in exchange for downplaying reports about JSPL obtaining favors from state officials.9

Further demonstrating the extent to which official collusion underwrites such dealings is the fact that the chairman of JSPL, Navin Jindal, was a Member of Parliament in the long-dominant Indian National Congress (INC) party. Concerns that political favoritism was undermining regulatory measures led the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) to recommend in 2012 that provincial governments should not be allowed to enter the cable or satellite broadcasting and distribution because clientelism and patronage already characterized media outlets affiliated with politicians’ families.10, 11 TRAI recommended that the functions of the national public broadcaster, Prasar Bharti, and the Ministry of Information an Broadcasting (MIB) be further segregated from one another in order to reduce the possibility of political pressure on media producers.

Regulators are also concerned about increased concentration through mergers and acquisitions spearheaded by major industrial groups entering the media market. In 2012, for example, the Indian petrochemicals major Reliance Industries financed the takeover of Ushodaya Enterprises’ ETV by Network18 Media & Investments Limited in exchange for a stake in Network18. The Competition Commission of India (CCI) ruled in 2012 that Reliance now controlled Network18 indirectly due to this deal.12 In 1996, Tara Teleservices services was formed to spearhead the Tata Group’s foray into telecommunications after it had helped establish the state-owned Videsh (p.774) Sanchar Nigam Limited (VSNL), India’s first Internet service provider (ISP) in 1986. VSNL and two of its subsidiaries were then merged to form Tata Communications in 2008.13 The Essel Group has expanded into the pay-TV market as Wire and Wireless India Limited (WWIL). And Reliance Communications, the media subsidiary of the industrial giant Reliance Industries, is one of the largest mobile operators in the world, with over 150 million subscribers.14, 15

Print Media

Newspapers

The first Indian-language newspapers appeared in 1822, 42 years after the first English-language newspapers began publishing.16 The vernacular press was strongly nationalistic and pro-independence, while the English-language ones reflected the British Indian establishment and were anti-independence. As a result, the authorities often shut down the non-English-language dailies. Kinship networks were important for maintaining these newspapers’ finances and distribution networks during this period, so after 1947, when India achieved independence from Great Britain, the value of the print market was extremely small: the First Press Commission (FPC) reported in 1956 that the print media sector was valued at only US$2 million (INR110 million) for the 127 newspapers surveyed, a rate of return of less than 1%. The FPC reported that newspapers continued to remain in business during the first decade of independence in spite of this low rate of return for two reasons: the overall effects of the economic boom caused by WWII and rent-seeking behavior by Indian political elites, which continues to this day.17, 18 Then and now, the Government of India financially subsidizes many small- and medium-sized newspapers. The increased availability of capital from the 1950s on, however, has been significant for publishers: by 1980, commercial advertising revenues were valued at US$27.4 million (INR1.5 billion) and rose to US$2 billion (INR110 billion) over the next 25 years.19 Even so, newspapers are still capital-intensive and characterized by low rates of return. Only Kasturi & Sons (publisher of The Hindu) and Indian Express Newspapers (publisher of The Indian Express) are unique in that they are exclusively invested in media properties and have no interests in other businesses, unlike most of their competitors (Table 25.1).

Table 25-1. Daily Newspapers (Market Shares by Revenue), 2000–2010

2000

2004

2008

2010

The Times Group (BCCL)

26.9

28.3

31.4

29.2

HT Media

N/A

8.2

9.7

9.7

Bhaskar Group

N/A

N/A

6.7

7.9

Deccan Chronicle Holdings Ltd. (DCHL)

N/A

1.9

6.4

7.1

Jagran Prakashan Ltd.

0.7

1.8

5.6

6.8

Kasturi & Sons

8.8

7.4

6.8

6.1

ABP Group

5.4

5.0

5.0

5.1

Manorama Group

5.2

5.0

4.0

4.3

Amar Ujala Publications

N/A

N/A

2.7

3.2

Lok Prakashan

3.9

3.8

2.9

2.6

Mathrubhumi Printing and Publishing Company Ltd.

2.7

2.8

2.2

2.6

Sakal Papers

N/A

2.3

2.3

2.4

Express Publications

3.0

2.0

1.5

1.6

Sandesh

2.8

2.1

1.2

1.3

Diligent Media Corp.

N/A

N/A

0.7

1.2

Ushodaya Enterprises

7.2

7.0

0.9

0.8

Rajasthan Patrika

1.8

2.0

0.5

0.7

Others

51.8

51.0

45.5

46.1

Total Revenue (mil INR)

4,250

6,080

1,228

1,255

Total Revenue (mil US$)

91.0

139.0

25.0

25.3

C4

48.2

48.9

54.5

53.9

HHI

960

1,074

1,313

1,228

N (>1%)

12

15

15

16

Noam Index

277

277

339

307

Source: Center for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE).

The Times Group (BCCL) publishes The Times of India and The Economic Times, which have a combined daily circulation of 4.3 million copies; The Times of India is the largest English-language daily in circulation worldwide.20 The Times Group publishes 13 dailies in total, along with 11 magazines—eight of which are produced in a joint venture with the BBC (UK)—and owns a number of radio stations. The Times Group’s main competitor, HT Media, was formed from the Hindustan Times Group, which had offered an IPO (one of the largest ever for an Asian media group) in response to the loss of revenue it incurred in a price war with the Times Group.21 Its properties also include newspapers, (p.775) magazines, and radio stations. According to the Indian Readership Survey (IRS), the Hindustan Times had a daily readership of 3.5 million in 2010.22 In the Hindi-language market, Dainik Jagran, published by Jagran Prakashan Ltd., and Dainik Bhaskar, published by the Bhaskar Group, are the top two titles, both with daily circulations of 16.4 million.23 The third-highest circulation Hindi-language daily (12.2 million copies), Hindustan Dainik, was formerly part of HT Media until 2009 when it became a separate entity.

The English-language market is concentrated in the metropolitan areas of New Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, and Chennai, which are home to most of India’s white collar, English-speaking population. Though the vernacular press has higher absolute circulation figures, English-language publications receive far more advertising revenue. In 2008, for instance, The Times Group’s titles collectively held a 3.7% market share measured by circulation, but 31.4% measured by advertising revenue.

(p.776) Several vernacular language media groups also hold significant market shares. Malayala Manorama Co., which publishes Malayala Manorama in the Malayalam language, has nearly 10 million daily readers. Ushodaya Enterprises, with its Telegu-language daily Eenadu has a total daily readership of 6 million.24 Ushodaya Enterprises also has interests in film production and distribution, and until 2010, it was heavily invested in the pay-TV market through its subsidiary ETV. DB Corp, which publishes the Hindi-language Dainik Bhaskar (founded in 1958), has a daily circulation of over 2 million copies daily. Jagran Prakashan Limited (JPL), publisher of the Hindi-language daily Dainik Jagran, has a daily circulation of 2.7 million copies and a total readership of 16.4 million as of 2010.25, 26 The ABP Group publishes the Bangla-language Ananda Bazar Patrika, with a daily circulation of approximately 6 million copies. The group also publishes eight magazines and owns three pay-TV channels (Table 25.2).27

Table 25-2. Daily Newspapers (Market Shares by Circulation), 1984–20081

1984

1988

1992

1996

2000

2004

2008

Indian Express Group (Indian Express)

5.4

5.4

3.2

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Bhaskar Group (Dainik Bhaskar)

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

3.9

5.3

5.6

Manorama Group (Malayalam Manorama)

5.2

5.4

4.1

4.5

4.7

4.1

4.2

The Times Group (BCCL) (The Times of India)

4.5

4.7

3.9

5.8

5.5

5.0

3.7

Mathrubhumi Printing and Publishing Company Ltd. (Mathrubhumi Malayalam)

3.7

N/A

N/A

3.4

N/A

N/A

N/A

Kasturi & Sons (The Hindu)

N/A

3.6

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

3.3

ABP Group (Anand Bazar Patrika)

3.6

3.4

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Punjab Kesri Group (Punjab Kesari)

N/A

N/A

3.5

3.9

N/A

N/A

N/A

Lok Prakashan Ltd. (Gujarat Samachar, Gujarati)

N/A

N/A

3.3

3.9

N/A

N/A

N/A

Jagran Prakashan Ltd. (Dainik Jagran)

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

3.6

6.3

6.3

HT Media (Hindustan Times)

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

3.6

N/A

Source: Audit Bureau of Circulation, India.

(1) Measuring market shares by circulation is complicated by the fact that several print publishers do not subscribe to the Audit Bureau of Circulation (ABC) and instead publish their own circulation figures.

Book Publishing

There are approximately 16,000 publishing houses in India, with a combined annual output of 80,000 titles. Of these, 25% are published in Hindi, with English accounting for slightly less (20%), and the remaining 55% falls across the vernacular languages.28 The market’s fortunes have been closely connected to government textbook orders since the 1940s: increased literacy—up from 20% of the population in 1948 to 64.8% in 2006—is in large part the (p.777) result of government literacy campaigns.29 The textbook market, worth at least US$17.9 million (INR981 million), was nationalized in the mid-1950s by the state. The Ministry of Human Resources Development oversees textbook publishing in India, and the National Council for Educational Research and Training (NCERT) was set up to publish and distribute textbooks. The affiliated state bodies publish books in vernacular languages.30 Until the 1990s, the commercial publishing industry was marginalized and several foreign firms left the market due to the nationalization campaign.

The largest companies in the textbook sector today are Oxford University Press, Macmillan, S. Chand and Co., Rupa Sterling, and Vikas.31 After market reforms were enacted in 1991, restrictions on FDI were relaxed: the 1999 Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA) replaced the draconian Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA), so several international publishers that had left the country in the 1950s returned and set up subsidiaries. These now include SAGE Publications, Picador, Random House, Routledge, Pearson, Butterworth–Heinemann, the Penguin Group, HarperCollins, Scholastic, and Cambridge University Press.32 According to a 2006 report, India’s publishing industry is worth US$20 billion (INR882 billion) and generates US$1.5 billion (INR66.2 billion) in revenue annually.33

Magazine Publishing

Magazine circulation has risen from 11 million copies in 1984 to 75 million by 2005 (Table 25.3).34 As with newspapers, advertising expenditures are skewed in favor of English-language titles with smaller (but higher-income) audiences. The largest magazine publisher is the India Today Group (ITG), which entered the market in 1975 with India Today, a biweekly magazine styled after the US TIME magazine, that is now published weekly in five languages. In 2000, ITG took in 3.5% of the total advertising revenue in the print media market, though by 2010 the group’s national market share had fallen to 1.7%.35

Table 25-3. Magazine Publishing (Market Shares by Revenue), 1996–2008

1996

2000

2004

2008

Living Media Group (ITG)

28.0

17.0

11.0

24.0

Outlook Group (Rajan Raheja Group)

N/A

7.0

6.0

5.0

Business India Group

9.0

5.0

5.0

N/A

Citra Lekha Group

6.0

5.0

4.0

3.0

The Times Group (BCCL)

N/A

5.0

N/A

4.0

Others

57.0

66.0

74.0

64.0

Total Circulation (1,000)

11,018

12,972

16,356

17,381

Total Revenue (mil INR)

N/A

N/A

5,300

13,700

Total Revenue (mil US$)

N/A

N/A

121

279

C4

43.0

34.0

26.0

36.0

HHI

901

388

198

626

N (>1%)

3

5

4

4

Noam Index

520

174

99

313

Source: Audit Bureau of Circulation, India; AdEx India.

In 2012 the Aditya Birla Group (ABG), a retail conglomerate that also owns the wireless provider Idea Cellular purchased 27.5 % stake in Living Media India, a subsidiary of ITG for US$ 63.8 million (INR 3.5 billion).36

Audiovisual Media

Radio

Commercial radio broadcasting began in India in 1925 with the Indian Broadcasting Company (IBC), which then became the national public broadcaster All India Radio (AIR) in 1936 due to financial difficulties.37 Radio news content is as of this writing still monopolized by AIR, and it took more a decade for AIR to cede its monopoly on entertainment programing. In 1993, AIR began selling FM channels to commercial entities, but in 1998 all of these channels were pulled off the air when their contracts expired because the government decided that (p.778) instead, it would auction off 108 radio licenses in geographical areas known as “circles” beginning in 2000. The next attempt at privatizing the FM market began in 1999, and the “circle” licenses were issued in 2001. Under the new licenses, broadcasters would pay an annual licensing fee worth 15% of their annual turnover. Licensing costs were exorbitant: ten licenses in Mumbai alone cost their bidders a combined US$20.9 million (INR975 million), whereas the advertising income for the transmission circle itself was valued at only US$4.3 million (INR200 million). Overbidding took place on national scale: the license fees for the 108 circles cost their buyers at least US$83.5 million (INR3.9 billion), while the market was valued at no more than US$24.1 million (INR1 billion). Losses continue to plague radio broadcasters: in 2004, 20 national broadcasters that had taken part in the 2001 auctions collectively posted total revenues of US$27.5 million (INR1.2 billion), but their expenses totaled US$54.9 million (INR2.4 billion), including US$ million US$25.2 million (INR1.1 billion) in licensing fees.

In 2005, the government announced an expansion of the number of licenses to 250 in 91 cities, valued at US$249 million (INR11 billion). The continued prevalence of high annual licensing fees, however, led commercial broadcasters to bring suits against the state. As a result, the state has since adopted a revenue-sharing model more favorable to the broadcasters for a third licensing phase (FM-3). In this phase, the state will auction off 338 new frequencies beginning in 2013, adding 700 stations to the market. The FM-3 auction will also, for the first time, permit commercial broadcasters to air news programming, breaking AIR’s decades-long monopoly. TRAI has recommended that the government increase the FDI for the sector from 20% to 26%.

Due to the development of FM channels offering entertainment content, the market share of AIR has fallen from an absolute monopoly in 2000 to a 30.6% market share in 2008. Its closest competitor is BCCL, through its subsidiary ENIL, with a second-place 28% market share (Table 25.4).

Table 25-4. Radio Group (Market Shares, by Revenue), 2000–2008

2000

2004

2008

All India Radio (AIR) (Prasar Bharti) (public)

100.0

49.2

30.6

ENIL (BCCL)

0.0

23.8

28.1

Music Broadcast Pvt. Ltd. (MBIL)

0.0

0.0

12.3

HT Media

0.0

0.0

3.3

Reliance Industries

0.0

0.0

3.1

MiD-Day Multimedia-Jagaran Prakashan (Jagaran Prakashan) + BBC Worldwide (BBC, UK) (public)

0.0

1.7

2.4

Others

0.0

25.4

20.4

Total Revenue (mil INR)

N/A

2,400

8,000

Total Revenue (mil US$)

N/A

54.9

163

C4

100.0

74.6

74.1

HHI

10,000

2,984

1,902

N (>1%)

1

3

6

Noam Index

10,000

1,723

776

Source: IndiaStat.com, ENIL, Indiantelevision.com, HT Media, MiD-Day Multimedia-Jagaran Prakashan, FICCI-PWC.

Broadcast Television

AIR began broadcasting television programming in 1959, and continued to do so until 1982, when Doordarshan (DD) was established by the state. Up until 1975, only seven Indian cities had access to the national terrestrial TV network. (p.779) Since then, access has grown exponentially: the number of households with television sets has increased from 2.8 million in 1984 to 138 million in 2010.38, 39 All homes connected to cable and satellite TV service receive DD (Table 25.5).

Table 25-5. TV Broadcasting (Market Shares by Revenue), 1984–2008

1984

1988

1992

1996

2000

2004

2008

2012

Doordarshan (DD) (Prasar Bharti) (public)

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Total Revenue (mil INR)

3,100

16,100

36,000

57,300

53,800

66,500

81,800

60,000

Total Revenue (mil US$)

250

1,073

2,057

1,769

1,152

1,522

1,687

1,030

C4

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

HHI

10,000

10,000

10,000

10,000

10,000

10,000

10,000

10,000

N (>1%)

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Noam Index

10,000

10,000

10,000

10,000

10,000

10,000

10,000

10,000

Source: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (MIB).

Multichannel TV Platforms

Cable TV operators emerged when color transmission became available in 1982. The market was established by unlicensed providers, who would set up master antennae for apartment buildings and then sell VCRs to individual units for a monthly fee. Multisystem operators (MSOs) remain, then and now, largely confined within wealthier urban neighborhoods, whereas local cable operators (LCOs) mainly operate in rural areas and poorer urban neighborhoods. In 1991, satellite TV channels became available, and in response, international broadcasters began encrypting their signals to prevent piracy, which spurred the government to begin regulating the market. Only in 1995 were cable operators retroactively legalized by the Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act. Following the law’s passage, an operators’ consortium was formed that brought the total number of cable operators down from 60,000 to 30,000.40 Indian MSOs are largely unregulated because ownership in the industry, classified as “small-scale,” is highly politicized: politicians (and their families) often own LCOs. The Sun TV Network and its distribution arm, Sumangali Cable Vision, for instance, belong to the parliamentarian Dayanidhi Maran. Sun TV contains some of the most watched channels in the southern state of Tamil Nadu. The company posted revenues of US$398 million (INR19.2 billion) in 2008 from its television operations. This does not include (undisclosed) revenue from Sumangali Cable Vision’s (p.780) operations, since Sumangali Cable Vision is a wholly owned subsidiary of Sun TV Network.

Lack of infrastructure remains a major challenge for cable and satellite operators: with more than 500 available channels and a carriage capacity of only 100, some MSOs have imposed a “placement fee” in addition to carriage fees.41 As a result, channel providers have pursued backward integration, setting up companies individually or as joint ventures, and undertaken a lobbying campaign to mandate digitization. The later effort has been successful, and so digitization is now being carried out in four phases, the first of which was completed in the major metropolitan areas of New Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, and Chennai by the end of 2012.42 All other major cities (those with a population of one million) are to complete the second phase of the campaign by the end of 2013. Phase three will be implemented shortly thereafter for all other municipalities, while the rest of the country is supposed to complete the process by the end of 2014.43 The high cost of the digitization campaign has led many companies to opt for direct-to-home (DTH) platforms. This programming has reached 13% of the estimated 134 million homes in India with television access, and the market was valued at US$618 million (INR30 billion) in 2008, but most DTH providers still operate at a loss. There is still room for growth, however, as the estimated market value is US$3.1 billion (INR149 billion) (Tables 25.6 and 25.7).44

Table 25-6. Multichannel Video Platforms: Cable MSOS (Market Shares by Revenue), 2004–2008

2004

2008

2013

Hathway Bhawani Cabletel & Datacom1

11.5

12.8

23.5

Zee (Essel Group)

6.0

11.4

11

DEN Networks2

N/A

3.0

18.5

Asianet Satellite (Asianet Communications: STAR TV; Jupiter Entertainment, US)3

0.1

DEN Networks

DEN Networks

Others

82.4

40.8

47

Total Revenue (bil INR)

99.0

167

Total Revenue (bil US$)

2.3

3.4

C4

17.6

59.0

53

HHI

6,924

1,666

1,016

N (>1%)

3

3

3

Noam Index

3,998

962

587

Source: Kohli-Khandekar (2010).

(1) Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp. owns a 17% stake in Hathway Bhawani Cabletel & Datacom.

(2) Includes STAR TV, a 50:50 joint venture between DEN Networks and with News Corp. that carries 25 channels.

(3) STAR TV is a 50:50 joint venture between DEN Networks and with News Corp.

Table 25-7. Multichannel Video Platforms: DTH (Market Shares by Revenue), 2004–2008

2004

2008

201245

Dish TV (Zee, Essel Group)

100.0

43.0

27.3

Tata Sky (Tata Group; Murdoch Family, News Corp., US/UK/AUS)

0.0

37.2

19.1

Sun Direct (Sun TV Network, Sun Group)

0.0

19.2

15.3

Bharti Airtel

0.0

0.0

16.5

Reliance Communications (Reliance Industries)

0.0

0.6

Total Revenue (mil INR)

N/A

3,050

91,883

Total Revenue (mil US$)

N/A

7.0

1,500

C4

100.0

99.9

78.2

HHI

10,000

3,601

1,616

N (>1%)

1

3

4

Noam Index

41,943

2,079

808

Source: Kohli-Khandekar (2010).

Video Channels

Hoteliers and their guests drove the initial demand for video channels in India during the 1990s so as to bring Indian hotels up to international standards; that is, upgrading channel access to include 24/7 programming from CNN (US) and other networks. In 1990, Hutchison Whampoa (Hong Kong) launched Satellite Television Asia Region (STAR) TV after purchasing a satellite that could transmit into both India and China. STAR TV then sought for an Indian partner to lease transponders to provide Hindi-language content and partnered with Zee to launch Asia Today. Launched in 1992, it became India’s first video channel, and for several years operated as a joint venture with Zee. Later, it added MTV (US) and BBC (UK) to its list, though these were dropped when Rupert (p.781) (p.782) Murdoch’s News Corp. purchased Hutchison Whampoa’s 63.6% stake in STAR TV in 1993. The BBC and MTV slots were soon filled by Sun Network TV, originally a Telegu-language channel in South India that has since expanded to offer 20 additional channels.46 Domestic content providers, such as New Delhi Television (NDTV), began moving to STAR TV over DD because of its more favorable advertising contract terms. Further consolidation can be expected in the foreseeable future, and concentration will continue to increase as more mergers and acquisitions take place.

At present Zee’s operations consist of 38 television channels, a film production house, and two newspapers.47 Zee’s pay channels are currently distributed by a joint venture called Media Pro Enterprise India Pvt. Ltd. Zee has a 74% stake in it, and the US company Turner International (Time Warner) holds the remaining 26%.

Sun TV Network has 32 TV channels in several languages. Its parent, Sun Group, owns 45 radio stations, 2 daily newspapers, and 4 magazine titles, the film production company Sun Pictures, Sun Direct (DTH), and Sumangali Cable Vision (SCV).48

The New Delhi Television Group (NDTV) began operating in the 1990s as a content provider for DD, but then launched a 24-hour news channel in 2003 and now has seven pay-TV channels.49 NDTV has content-sharing arrangements with several print media partners, especially the newspapers the Indian Express and The Hindu.

The Network18 Group consists of TV 18 and Network18. TV 18 is a joint venture of Network18 and NBCUniversal, owned by GE/Comcast (US). In India, Network 18 owns 13 television channels, a film production company, and interests in magazine publishing and printing as well. In a joint venture with Sun TV Network, it distributes several vernacular language channels in South India. In FY2011–12, the company reported revenues of US$49.2 million (INR2.7 billion).50

One of the most significant acquisitions in the Indian audiovisual market was the 2012 deal between Reliance Communications and Network18. The Network18 Group had a total debt of about US$49.2 million (INR4.7 billion), and it was in the process of acquiring the assets of Ushodaya Enterprises’ Eenadu TV (ETV).51 The deal, estimated to be worth US$273 million (INR15 billion), was structured to help Network18 pay off its debt and simultaneously acquire ETVs assets.52 Besides securing indirect control of Network18, Reliance also gained exclusive video channel content in several vernacular languages for 4G mobile distribution.

Other important companies in the video channel market are ESPN (US)—which has been able to take advantage of the popularity of cricket in India to carve out a niche—BBCL, the India Today Group (ITD), and, until 2012, the STAR TV-ABP joint venture Media Content & Communications Services (MCCS) (Table 25.8).53

Table 25-8. Cable And DBS TV Programming Channels (Market Shares by Revenue), 2000–2010

2000

2004

2008

2010

Sun TV Network (Sun Group)

9.5

14.4

18.5

22.3

Zee (Essel Group)

47

31.1

30.1

30.2

ESPN India (Walt Disney, US)

9.4

13.5

16.9

15.2

New Delhi Television (NDTV)

6.8

3.9

6.6

5.3

India Today Group (ITG)

N/A

9.1

5.0

4.8

Network18 Group

N/A

2.8

9.0

7.9

Asianet Communications (STAR TV; Jupiter Entertainment, US)1

N/A

3.3

3.3

3.9

Sahara India Commercial Corporation

N/A

2.3

3.6

3.1

Times Global Broadcasting Co. (BCCL)

N/A

N/A

2.2

3.5

Malayalam Communications

N/A

1.2

0.7

0.8

Raj Television Network

3.1

2.3

1.2

0.8

Mavis Satcom

0.3

2.6

0.7

0.7

MCCS India (ABP; STAR TV)

N/A

5.6

0.1

0.1

Others

27.4

32.1

25.5

24.4

Total Revenue (mil INR)

9,900

15,400

46,600

59,200

Total Revenue (mil US$)

212

352

961

1,290

C4

72.6

68.0

74.5

75.6

HHI

2,442

1,517

1,712

1,793

N (>1%)

5

12

10

9

Noam Index

1,092

438

541

598

Source: Center for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE).

(1) STAR TV is a 50:50 joint venture between DEN Networks and with News Corp.

Film

In India, distinctions among film producers, distributors, and exhibitors are blurred: most studios in this sector manage at least two of these activities directly, most notably the old family-owned studios such as Rajshri Productions, RK Films, Yashraj Films, and Ushodaya Enterprises. These studios were able to hang on through difficult times after independence. From the 1940s (p.783) on, studios were increasingly hard-pressed to secure capital, and so a number of other established studios had to shut down. Financing films became a risky business during this period, and the prevailing model was for production companies to come together for individual projects and then disband upon the conclusion of one. This trend continued through the 1980s and 1990s, when the number of moviegoers dropped from 12.2 million in 1986 to 5 million in 1992. By late 1990s, the industry began to turn its fortunes around by expanding its operations to include the sale of music and television rights, growing overseas distribution networks to cater to the Indian Diaspora, and successfully producing several blockbusters that reinvigorated national audiences’ interest in domestic productions.

By 2008, market value had grown exponentially, by 350%, partly thanks to the transition to digital projectors and the opening of multiplexes after 1997 when PVR Cinemas opened in Delhi. As box office receipts increased, financial enterprises began purchasing assets in film production and distribution, thus substantially increasing the availability of capital. In addition, in 1998, the government decided to allow up to 100% FDI in the industry.54 Domestic film production has increased to a global high of over 3,000 in recent years as a result of these liberalization policies: 1,000 domestic movies grossed (p.784) about US$2 billion (INR97 billion) from the sale of 3.3 billion tickets nationally in 2008.55 The market has expanded at a compounded annual rate of growth (CAGR) of 17.7% between 2006 and 2009, and CAGR is expected to increase at a rate of 9.1% through 2016 before plateauing.56

The more organized production and distribution networks that existed in the 1940s are reemerging. Although concentration remains low, the number of companies in production and distribution fell from 59 in 2002 to 49 in 2004 to 36 in 2008 (Table 25.9).

Table 25-9. Film Production/Distribution (Market Shares by Box Office %), 2000–2008

2004

2008

2010

Eros Entertainment

4.3

3.8

12.9

Yash Raj Films

7.2

5.7

0.0

Sun Pictures (Sun Group)

N/A

0.9

9.1

Baba Arts

0.7

1.1

6.5

Mukta Arts

2.8

5.1

4.7

Shree Ashtavinayak Cine Vision

1.4

3.8

3.4

Reliance Mediaworks (Reliance Industries)

N/A

4.9

5.3

Viacom 18 Media (Network18, Reliance ADAG)

N/A

1.4

3.3

UTV (UTV; Walt Disney, US)

3.4

5.6

9.3

Fox Star Studio (20th Century Fox, Murdoch Family, News Corp., US/UK/AUS)

N/A

2.9

4.1

Warner Bros. (Time Warner, US)

N/A

4.2

1.3

Columbia TriStar (Sony, Japan/US)

2.5

6.5

0.8

Universal (GE/Comcast, US)

N/A

5.8

0.9

Tips Industries

5.4

1.1

1.2

K Sera Sera

2.0

2.0

1.5

Inox

0.6

0.0

0.0

PVR Cinemas

N/A

1.1

1.0

Mediaone Global Entertainment

N/A

0.6

0.7

Fame India

0.6

0.5

0.2

Midvalley

N/A

1.4

0.8

Shringar

0.5

0.5

N/A

National Film Development Corp.

N/A

0.7

N/A

Others

68.5

40.3

33.0

Total Revenue (mil INR)

18,600

32,500

24,400

Total Revenue (mil US$)

426

670

535

C4

20.3

23.6

37.9

HHI

132

259

476

N (>1%)

8

16

13

Noam Index

47.0

65.0

132.0

Source: Center for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE).

(p.785) Telecommunications Media

Wireline Telecom

Until the 1990s, handsets were considered a luxury good in India, and call rates were prohibitively expensive. In 1991, the long-distance calling market was partially privatized. TRAI was set up in 1997 to oversee the market as it was liberalized. Increased per capita incomes in India have driven (and reinforced) the growth of the market. Until 2000, the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) was the sole landline provider, after which point it lost significant market share because of the poor quality of its services.

Bharti Airtel, the fifth largest telecom operator in the world, enjoyed a greater market share than its nearest rival, Tata Communications, in the early 2000s as a result of an aggressive marketing campaign.57 By 2008, Tata Communications and Bharti Airtel were close competitors, though DoT still dominated the market, and a fourth market entrant, Quadrant Televentures, had been reduced to a marginal entity. In 2010, Tata Communications finally overtook Bharti Airtel’s market share by pursuing a strategy of building new infrastructure in underserved rural and urban areas (Table 25.10).

Table 25-10. Wireline Telecom1

2000

2004

2009

2011

Department of Telecommunications (public) (Govt. of India)

98.1

88.3

86.6

81.0

  • BSNL (Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd.) (public)

77.1

70.4

  • MTNL (Mahangar Telephone Nigam Ltd.) (public)

9.5

10.6

Tata Teleservices (Tata Group)

0.5

3.0

2.5

4.3

Bharti Airtel

0.3

8.0

7.3

10.2

Reliance Communications (Reliance Industries)

3.0

3.9

Quadrant Televentures

0.0

0.7

0.5

0.6

Total Revenue (bil INR)

50.0

262

Total Revenue (bil US$)

1.1

6.0

C4

100.0

100.0

99.7

99.3

HHI

9,630

7,865

7,568

6,699

N (>1%)

1

3

4

4

Noam Index

9,630

4,541

3,784

3,350

Source: Center for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE); Bharti Airtel.

(1) 2000–2004 by revenue, 2009–2011 by subscribers. Tables consolidated by editor.

The industry has remained concentrated due to the limited number of licenses granted and a lack of capital investment in infrastructure. These conditions will persist, since wireless telecom is an established, more affordable option with a high household penetration rate.

Wireless Telecom

There were 4 million registered mobile users in India in 2004 and 874 million in 2011.58 (p.786) The market opened up in 1992 when the DoT invited bids for mobile services in the four largest metropolitan areas—New Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, and Chennai—which led to significant overbidding by prospective licensees; mobile services were then introduced commercially two years later. By 1998, eight mobile operators (and some landline operators that had also entered the market) had defaulted on their license fees. Only Bharti Airtel (then Bharti Tele-ventures) reported a profit for that year, which came to a mere US$0.6 million (INR25 million). In response, a new national telecommunications policy was implemented in 1999, and a market boom began after 2002; three years in, the number of mobile phones overtook landlines. Since 2000, the availability of mobile services though wireless has increased greatly, particularly in rural areas, where there is still little wireline infrastructure. The market continues to grow rapidly: 130 million new subscribers were added in 2008, up from 95 million new subscribers in 2007. In 2008, India’s wireless phone subscriber base stood at 386 million individuals.59

Reliance Communications took a very different route into this market from other firms, namely Bharti Airtel, by offering a low-end wireless in local loop (WiLL) technology to low-income customers. This means Reliance does not have to bid for a telecommunications license like its competitors do. It has acquired a controversial reputation among other providers because after securing low-income customers, Reliance’s focus shifted to imposing higher-spectrum fees and marketing more expensive full-service platforms (Table 25.11).

Table 25-11. Wireless Telecom (Market Shares by Revenue), 2000–2010

2000

2004

2008

2010

201363

Bharti Airtel

20.9

25.2

29.1

34.1

30.9

Reliance Communications (Reliance Industries)

2.8

2.6

21.0

15.0

7.6

Vodafone India (Vodafone, UK)

35.0

24.0

19.3

23.0

23.4

Idea Cellular (ABG Group)

10.8

14.7

9.9

11.2

16.2

BSNL/Department of Telecommuni-cations (public)

N/A

23.3

15.0

10.4

6.6

Tata Communications (Tata Group) + DoCoMo (Japan)

2.7

4.9

2.2

1.9

7.5

Dishnet Wireless (Siva Group)

N/A

N/A

0.7

1.5

Sun Network (Sun Group)

2.9

2.9

2.0

2.1

Loop Mobile

14.4

3.2

0.8

0.6

Sistema Shyam Teleservices

N/A

0.7

0.2

0.2

Others

18.8

12.7

20.9

16.6

7.7

Total Revenue (bil INR)

23,7

140

778

1,056

1,489

Total Revenue (bil US$)

0.5

3.2

15.8

23.2

C4

81.2

87.3

79.1

83.4

78.1

HHI

2,012

2,019

1,991

2,164

1,922

N (>1%)

7

8

7

8

6

Noam Index

760

713

753

765

785

Source: Center for Monitoring of Indian Economy (CMIE).

Concentration has increased in recent years, and one event in particular stands out because the increase in concentration represented the fallout of an anti-corruption investigation by regulators: in 2012, Bharti Airtel, Vodafone India and Idea Cellular together gained 6.9 million subscribers when the Supreme Court of India ordered the cancellation of 122 licenses, including ones for international groups such as Telenor (Norway), Sistema (Russia) and Etisalat (UAE) that had been awarded in 2008.60 TRAI stated it sought to lower concentration in 2008 by awarding these 122 licenses, but the Supreme Court ordered their annulment due to corruption charges that had been brought against the then-minister of telecommunications. The investigation had been started because of significant discrepancies between the licensing fees that were estimated and the sums actually collected. Some US$190 billion (INR1.8 trillion) was lost as a result of the now-defunct licenses, according to the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG). Other state agencies have estimated the losses to be lower, though at a still massive US$32.8 billion (INR310 billion) deficit.

Internet Media

Internet Service Providers (ISP)

Initially, when the Internet became available in India 1995, access was limited to the major cities under the aegis of the public monopolist Videsh Sanchar Nigam Limited (VSNL), which is now part of Tata Communications. By 2008, there were 12.9 million Internet subscribers in India and by 2011, the market penetration rate reached 10.2%, or 121 million active users.61, 62 The ISP market is highly integrated with the wireless market, so much so that the two are effectively undifferentiated by regulators.

There is no equity cap to foreign investment in ISPs that do not provide gateways or infrastructure. However, foreign-owned Indian subsidiaries firms must divest 26% of their equity (p.787) in favor of Indian owners within five years as a condition for entering the market, and their services are subject to stringent licensing and data security requirements (Table 25.12).64

Table 25-12. Internet Service Providers (Market Shares by Revenue), 1996–20081

1996

2000

2004

2008

2013

Department of Telecommunications (public)

100.0

0.9

0.3

69.1

Reliance Communications (Reliance Industries)

0.0

34.3

48.3

11.9

Sify

0.0

33.9

14.4

8.1

Exlservice.com

0.0

7.9

8.1

Hathway Cable & Datacom

0.0

6.0

5.4

1.7

Bharti Airtel

0.0

5.7

6.5

Dishnet (Zee)

0.0

5.3

7.0

0.8

rediff.com

0.0

4.9

Ortel Communications

0.0

0.1

Others

0.0

55.8

36.4

30.1

10.8

Total Revenue (mil INR)

N/A

1,700

21,600

68,100

135,904

Total Revenue (mil US$)

N/A

36.4

494

1,384

2,200

C4

100.0

44.2

63.6

70.1

89.2

HHI

10,000

1,201

1,532

2,526

4,962

N (>1%)

1

3

5

5

4

Noam Index

10,000

693

685

1,130

2,481

Source: Telecom Regulatory Authority (TRAI).

(1) Tata Communications and VSNL are not included in Table 25.12 because they operate in the gateways and overseas business.

Search Engines

Google (US) and Yahoo! (US) dominate the market. Consumers were quick to adopt Google and Yahoo! because English is seen as the language of the upwardly mobile young Indian professional and also because English-speaking members of the Indian Diaspora had heavily invested in developing ICT platforms for the Indian market. Both Google and Yahoo! are deepening their presence in India by offering more Hindi- and vernacular language content. However, the non-English market is relatively underserved when compared with the depth of the average search volume for English-language results (Table 25.13).

Table 25-13. Internet Search Engines (Market Shares by Revenue), 2008

2008

Google

81.4

Yahoo!

9.4

Ask.com

1.9

MSN (Microsoft)

1.7

Rediff.com

1.5

Facebook

0.8

C4

94.4

HHI

6,724

N (>1%)

5

Noam Index

3,015

Source: ComScore, TH@T! Company.

Online News

One of the first Indian Internet portals was IndiaWorld.com, launched in 1995. The site initially charged a subscription fee but eventually (p.788) (p.789) shifted to a free-content model. Reflecting the limited growth of the market in its early days, in 1997, the site generated 95% of its traffic from outside India. By 1997, though, Indian traffic numbers rose so much that the site’s owners created specialized sports, news, and lifestyle portals. In 1999, IndiaWorld.com was bought by Satyam Infoway for US$115 million (IN$;5 billion) and was registering 13 million page views a month.65 Another early major Indian portal was rediff.com, also started in 1995. In 2010, it had 95 million registered users and had revenues of US$21.8 million (INR992 billion).66, 67 BCCL’s The Times Group launched Indiatimes.com in 1999, and the group’s sites now collectively receive over 400 million monthly page views. The Times Group’s sites represent the country’s third largest online news portal in terms of traffic, just behind rediff.com and Yahoo! (Table 25.14).68

Table 25-14. Online News Media (Market Shares by Monthly Unique Visitors), 2010–2011

2010

2011

NDTV.com (NDTV)

4.2

4.9

The New York Times Online (The New York Times Group, US)

12.0

11.9

CNN.com (Time Warner, US)

2.0

3.9

Yahoo! News Network (US)

8.3

32.7

Oneindia.in

0.8

8.0

Times of India Online (The Times Group, BCCL)

23.7

HT Media

8.2

BBC.co.uk (UK) (public)

5.7

The Indian Express Group

4.5

Others

0.0

C4

26.4

76.5

HHI

1,996

N (>1%)

9

Noam Index

665

Source: ComScore.

The Indian Express and Hindustan Times have both successfully used their online presence to compensate for their limited print distribution network outside of the major metropolitan areas. Despite the growing potential of the market, most Indian online news outlets are unconnected to a print publication.

Conclusion

The most significant area of growth for Indian media markets has been in the provision of vernacular language content across all media. Concentration is increasing for the rapidly expanding telecommunications and pay-TV markets, but not the print media market, which (p.790) is also growing significantly, in contrast to the downward trends in most of the other countries surveyed in this study (the newspaper market will continue to grow at a 17% CAGR between 2013 and 2015).69 In addition, the 2011 Indian census suggests that while 26% of the Indian population in still illiterate, this represents a marked improvement from 35% in 2001.70 Since consumption of print media is closely linked to literacy rates, this is good news for the market. The audiovisual market has grown faster than the print market, since it is not directly linked to literacy, and the telecommunications market has grown the fastest of all.

Indian media analysts are particularly concerned about the strong ties between content producers and political elites. Their ownership of local news outlets is closely linked to the problem of objective news coverage in industrial disputes and in tracking campaign finances. Disclosure requirements for media producers are met with a bare minimum of effort. The recommendations by TRAI that public operators stay out of the satellite TV market is causing a political uproar because politicians and their patronage networks wish to take advantage of this growing market.

TRAI’s ability to contest such a policy is very limited. It lacks the authority of a body such as the US’s Federal Communications Commission (FCC) or the UK’s Ofcom, and is only able to initiate review proposals for market-entry regulations or guidelines on mergers and acquisitions. The absence of a true umbrella media regulator means that advertising content regulations are quite lax. There is a preference among media producers for advertiser-oriented supplements and meeting the demands of advertisers. BCCL has actually institutionalized these practices with its “MediaNet” placement system, which provides firms with paid advertorials inThe Times Group’s titles. The phenomenon of large industrial conglomerates investing heavily in media companies—either through direct ownership or indirect actions such as offering or withholding advertising revenue—is still largely undiscussed in the Indian context.

TRAI would either have to have its mandate greatly expanded to address these issues, or be subsumed into a wholly new agency that would actually have the authority of an FCC or Ofcom. Such an agency would not be well received by many politicians or by media conglomerates, especially those in the pay-TV market, who benefit from the gaps in the existing regulatory structures.

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Singhal, Arvind; Doshi, J. K.; Rogers, Everett M.; and S. Adnan, Rahman. “Diffusion of Television in India.” Media Asia 15:4, 1988. Aug. 5, 2012. <http://utminers.utep.edu/asinghal/Articles%20and%20Chapters/Singhal-Rogers-Doshi-Rahman-1988-Diffusion%20of%20television.pdf>. 222–229.

Subramanian, N. Sundaresha. “RIL Controls Network18 Group Indirectly, Says CCI.” Business Standard, June 23, 2012. June 23, 2012. <http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/ril-controls-network18-group-indirectly-says-cci/478250/>.

“Sun TV Network Net Profit Declines 12.42% in the June 2012 Quarter.” IIFL, Aug. 3, 2012. Dec. 26, 2012. <http://www.indiainfoline.com/Markets/News/Sun-TV-Network-net-profit-declines-12.42-percent-in-the-June-2012-quarter/4441514693>.

Taneja, Mansi. “Top Three Players Consolidate Position in Telecom Market.” Business Standard, Apr. 22, 2012. <http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/top-three-players-consolidate-position-in-telecom-market/472221/>.

Thierer, Adam. “The Rule Of Three: The Nature of Competition in the Digital Economy.” Forbes, June 29, 2012. Dec. 25, 2012. <http://www.forbes.com/sites/adamthierer/2012/06/29/the-rule-of-three-the-nature-of-competition-in-the-digital-economy/>.

“Time Schedule for Digitization of Cable System.” India Telecom Online, Apr. 17, 2011, Dec. 25, 2012. <http://www.indiatelecomonline.com/time-schedule-for-digitization-of-cable-system/>.

Trikha, Jatin; Garg, Manish; and Singh, Supreet. “Market Sizing and Future Growth Potential of Telecom in ABS Segment.” Presentation, July 30, 2009. Feb. 21, 2013. <http://www.scribd.com/doc/17855326/Airtel-Ppt>.

“Wireless Subscribers Base at 386 mn + Airtel Losing to Reliance + Broadband Growth Slows Down.” goBroadband, Apr. 23, 2009. July 2, 2012. <http://convergence.in/blog/2009/04/23/wireless-subscribers-base-at-386-mn-airtel-losing-to-reliance-broadband-growth-slowsdown/>.

2. Reports

Audit Bureau of Circulation. “January-June 2010.” Mumbai: Audit Bureau of Circulation, 2010. & Audit Bureau of Circulation. “July-December 2010.” Mumbai: Audit Bureau of Circulation, 2010.

Broadcasting Corporation of India (Prasar Bharati). “Annual Report 2007–08.” New Delhi: Prasar Bharati, 2008. <http://prasarbharati.gov.in/NR/rdonlyres/5A7A0DC9-B6B6-4E7A-9C38-021E363E0367/3599/PBFINALREPORT.doc>.

Broadcasting Corporation of India (Prasar Bharati). “Annual Report 2008–09.” New Delhi: Prasar Bharati, 2009. Feb. 21, 2013. <http://prasarbharati.gov.in/NR/rdonlyres/5A7A0DC9-B6B6-4E7A-9C38-021E363E0367/3634/EnglishPDF.pdf>.

Doordarshan and Annual reports of Ministry of I&B. Reports for 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 2000 and 2004 <http://prasarbharati.gov.in/NR/rdonlyres/5A7A0DC9-B6B6-4E7A-9C38-021E363E0367/3634/EnglishPDF.pdf>

Emerging Markets Information Service (EMIS), ISI Emerging Markets: A Euromoney Institutional Investor Company, India Reports.

Entertainment Network (India) Limited (ENIL). “Annual Report 2007–08.” Mumbai: ENIL, 2008. Feb. 21, 2013. <http://www.enil.co.in/pdf/annual_reports/enil_annual_report_2007_2008.pdf>.

Ernst & Young. “The Animation and Gaming Industry in India: A Report by Ernst & Young.” New Delhi: NASSCOM, 2009. July 12, 2012 <http://www.nasscom.org/animation-and-gaming-industry-indiaa-report-ernst-young>.

Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), Media and Entertainment Division Report, “FICCI Frames” of March 2000, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2009.

Government of India. “Report of the Press Commission.” New Delhi: Government of India Press, 1954.

Government of India, Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) Annual reports of 1997–98, 1999–2000, 2000–01, 2003–04

HT Media. “Annual Report 2007–08.” New Delhi: HT Media, 2008. Feb. 21, 2013. <http://www.htmedia.in/HTMLCorpImages/HTMediaCorpSite/pdf/Reports/Annual_Report_FY_2007-2008.pdf>.

Indian Readership Survey (IRS). IRS Q1 2012 Topline Findings. Media Research Users Council, 2012. Feb. 20, 2013. <http://mruc.net/irs2012q1-topline-findings.pdf>.

Indian Readership Survey (IRS). IRS Q2 2011 Topline Findings. Media Research Users Council, (p.793) 2012. Feb. 20, 2013. <http://mruc.net/irs2011q2-topline-finding.pdf>.

Indian Readership Survey (IRS). IRS Q4 2010 Topline Findings. Mumbai: Media Research Users Council, 2012. Feb. 18, 2012. <http://www.pdfone.com/download/11_meri-saheli-hindi/irs-2010-q4-topline-findings-hansa-research-market-research.html>.

“Industry and Services: Media and Entertainment.” New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India Investment & Technology Promotion (ITP) Division, 2009. May 10, 2012. <http://www.indiainbusiness.nic.in/industry-infrastructure/service-sectors/media-entertainment.htm>

“Investing in India, Foreign Direct Investment, Policy and Procedures of 2006.” New Delhi: Department of Policy and Promotion, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India, 2007. Dec. 25, 2012. <http://dipp.nic.in/English/Archive/FDI_Manual/FDI_Manual_text_Latest.pdf>.

Ipsos. “India Pulse.” Mumbai: Ipsos, 2012. Feb. 18, 2013. <http://www.ipsos.com/sites/ipsos.com/files/India%20Pulse%20-%20October%202012.pdf>.

KPMG and FICCI. “Hitting the High Notes: FICCI-KPMG Indian Media and Entertainment Industry Report 2011.” kmpg.com, 2011. Feb. 18, 2013. <http://www.kpmg.com/IN/en/IssuesAndInsights/ThoughtLeadership/FICCI-KPMG-Report-2011.pdf>.

KPMG and FICCI. “In the interval, but ready for the next act: FICCI-KPMG Media and Entertainment Industry Report 2009.” kmpg.com, 2009. Feb. 18, 2013. <http://www.kpmg.com/IN/en/ThoughtLedership/In%20the%20interval-%20But%20ready%20for%20the%20next%20act.pdf>.

“Media Guide India.” New Delhi: Lowe Lintas and Partners, 2001.

MiD-Day Multimedia. “23rd Annual Report 2003-2004.” Mumbai: Next MediaWorks Ltd., 2004.

MiD-Day Multimedia. “27th Annual Report 2008-2008.” Mumbai: Next MediaWorks Ltd., 2008. Feb. 21, 2013. <http://nextmediaworks.com/annual-reports/annualreport07-08.pdf>.

Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (MIB). “Annual Report 2010–2011.” New Delhi: Additional Director General (In-charge), Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 2011. Feb. 21, 2013. <http://www.mib.nic.in/writereaddata/html_en_files/document/docu_other/ar/AnnualReport2010-11-English.pdf>.

Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (MIB). “Annual Report 2011–2012.” New Delhi: Additional Director General (In-charge), Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 2012. Feb. 21, 2013. <http://www.mib.nic.in/writereaddata/html_en_files/document/docu_other/ar/AnnualReport2011-12-English.pdf>.

NDTV. “Highlights for the Quarter ended 30 June 2012.” New Delhi: NDTV, 2012. Dec. 27, 2012. <http://www.ndtv.com/convergence/ndtv/corporatepage/images/PressReleaseQ1FY2013_2.pdf>.

Network 18. “Annual Report: 2011–2012.” New Delhi: Network18, 2012. Dec. 27, 2012. <http://www.network18online.com/reports/AnnualReportFinal210812.pdf>.

“NRS 2006—Key Findings.” The Hindu, 2006. Feb. 20, 2013. <http://www.hindu.com/nic/nrs.htm>.

PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC). “The Indian Entertainment & Media Industry: Sustaining Growth, Report 2008.” New Delhi: PwC India, 2008. Feb. 18, 2013. <http://industry.bfi.org.uk/media/pdf/9/e/The_Indian_Entertainment___Media_Industry.pdf>.

PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC). “PwC India Entertainment and Media Outlook 2011.” New Delhi: PwC India, 2011. Feb. 18, 2013. <http://www.pwc.in/en_IN/in/assets/pdfs/publications-2011/India_Entertainment_and_Media_Outlook_2011.pdf>.

“Quarterly report on the results for the third quarter and nine month ended December 31, 2011.” New Delhi: Bharti Airtel, 2012. July 12, 2012. <http://www.airtel.in/QuarterlyResult/Quarterly_report_Q3_11.pdf>.

“Reliance Communications Annual Report 2010-11.” Hyderabad: Reliance Communications, 2011. Jan. 16, 2012. <http://www.bseindia.com/bseplus/AnnualReport/532712/5327120311.pdf>.

RK Swamy/BBDO. “Media Market Guide India 1997-98.” TV Navigator, Media Division, cited in p 24, Revenue of All India Radio for years 1991–92, 1995–96 and 2003–04.

Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI). “Annual Report 2004–05.” New Delhi: TRAI, 2006. Feb. 20, 2013. <http://www.trai.gov.in/WriteReadData/UserFiles/Documents/AnuualReports/ar_04_05.pdf>.

Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI). “Annual Report 2006–07.” New Delhi: TRAI, 2008. Feb. 20, 2013. (p.794) <http://www.trai.gov.in/WriteReadData/UserFiles/Documents/AnuualReports/ar_06_07.pdf>.

Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI). “Annual Report 2007–08.” New Delhi: TRAI, 2009. Feb. 20, 2013. <http://www.trai.gov.in/WriteReadData/UserFiles/Documents/AnuualReports/ar_07_08.pdf>.

Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI). “Point of Interconnection (POIs) Congestion report of the Cellular Mobile Telephone Service Providers (CMTS) and Basic Telephone Service (Wireline) Providers for the months of October, November & December 2011.” TRAI, 2012. Feb. 12, 2012. <http://www.trai.gov.in/WriteReadData/PIRReport/Documents/NW-report-December11.pdf>.

Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI). “Recommendations on Issues relating to entry of certain entities into Broadcasting and Distribution activities.” New Delhi: TRAI, 2008. Feb. 19, 2013. <http://www.cccindia.co/corecentre/Database/Docs/DocFiles/trai1.pdf>.

Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited. “Annual Report 1999–2000.” Mumbai: Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited, 2000. Dec. 27, 2012. <http://vidz.zeecdn.com/zeetele/pdfs/zeeannualreport1999-bba65e04c3a412b.pdf>.

Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited. “Annual Report 2000–2001.” Mumbai: Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited, 2001. Dec. 27, 2012. <http://vidz.zeecdn.com/zeetele/pdfs/zeeannualreport2001-2563b8804483360.pdf>.

Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited. “Annual Report 2002–2003.” Mumbai: Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited, 2003. Dec. 27, 2012. <http://vidz.zeecdn.com/zeetele/pdfs/fullannualreports-2bcee2059a01293.pdf>.

Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited. “Annual Report 2004–2005.” Mumbai: Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited, 2005. Dec. 27, 2012. <http://vidz.zeecdn.com/zeetele/pdfs/annualreport2005-92c4498514b21a1.pdf>.

Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited. “Annual Report 2006–2007.” Mumbai: Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited, 2012. Dec. 27, 2012. <http://vidz.zeecdn.com/zeetele/pdfs/annualreport2007-9a87a39a200cbcb.pdf>.

Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited. “Annual Report 2008–2009.” Mumbai: Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited, 2009. Dec. 27, 2012. <http://vidz.zeecdn.com/zeetele/pdfs/annualreportfulldownload-55e7cd63e7273ab.pdf>.

Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited. “Annual Report 2010–2011.” Mumbai: Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited, 2011. Dec. 27, 2012. <http://vidz.zeecdn.com/zeetele/pdfs/annualreport2011-e6876aa5f3f67f3.pdf>.

Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited. “Annual Report 2011–2012.” Mumbai: Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited, 2012. Dec. 27, 2012. <http://vidz.zeecdn.com/zeetele/pdfs/zeear2011-121-e72d9565b5c91b6.pdf>.

3. Websites

ABP: Mjoy. abp.in, 2011. Aug. 2, 2011. <http://www.abp.in/index.php?show=22002>.

AdEx India. Television Audience Measurement Media Research (TAM), 2012. <http://www.tamindia.com/tamindia/>.

AIR Radio (1990–2013). indiastate.com, 2013. Feb. 21, 2013. <http://www.indiastat.com/media/21/radiofm/236/airradio19902013/450129/stats.aspx>.

Centre for Monitoring of Indian Economy (CMIE). cmie.com, 2012. July 8, 2012. <http://www.cmie.com/>.

NDTV. New Delhi: NDTV Convergence Limited, 2010. Oct. 25, 2010. <http://www.ndtv.com/convergence/ndtv/corporatepage/index.aspx>.

Sun TV Channel. Sun Group, 2009. July 5, 2012. <http://www.sun.in/television.aspx>.

Tata Communications: About. tatacommunications.com, 2012. June 28, 2012. <http://www.tatacommunications.com/about/network.asp>.

Worldspace Indian Limited. franchiseindia.com, 2012. Oct. 28, 2012. <http://www.franchiseindia.com/categoryDetails.php?catid=13&id=FIHL4110692&pageID=1>.

4. Interviews

Mitra, Chandan; Managing Editor, The Pioneer. Personal interview with Anuradha Bhattacharjee. May 24, 2007.

Singh, Prabhakar; Regional Head, Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy. Personal interview with Anuradha Bhattacharjee. May 24, 2012.

(p.795) India—Data Summaries

INDIA HAS THE SECOND-LARGEST domestic media market in the world by population size, but per capita spending is low (Table 25.15). India’s overall national power index declined from 4,311 to 2,923 due to privatization in the market. The company that had the highest company power index—the state telecom monopolist BSNL—dropped from 2,679 to 1,205.33 due to competition from privately owned mobile platform companies such as Reliance and Bharti Enterprises, the latter of which became the top platform company in India after 2004 (Table 25.17). BSNL service prices and reliability were such that many customers left when alternatives became available after 2000. BSNL’s market share as a platform provider declined by 4.18% per annum while Bharti Enterprises’ increased by 2.23% and Reliance’s by 1.5%.

Table 25-15. National Media Industries Concentration in India

2004/5

2011 or Most Recent

% Change Annual Average

Company Power Index in Country

Company Share of the Overall National Media Market (%)

Company Power Index in Country

Company Share of the Overall National Media Market (%)

Company Power Index in Country

Company Share of the Overall National Media Market (%)

BSNL (Public)

2,679

34.0

1,205

20.2

–9.2

–2.3

Bharti Enterprises

156

8.1

640

20.5

51.8

2.1

Prasar Bharti (Public)

1011

10.2

241

2.5

–12.7

–1.3

Reliance Industries (Anil Dhirubhai Ambani Group)

40

1.7

129

9.2

37.8

1.3

Vodafone (UK)

122

5.1

282

12.3

22.0

1.2

Zee Entertainment

34

1.9

70

3.1

17.6

0.2

Google (US)

78

0.71

96

1.2

4.0

0.08

BCCL (The Times of India Group)

83

3.1

62

2.3

–4.2

–0.13

Tata Group

7

1.9

7

2.1

0.42

0.04

Sun Group

7

0.97

18

1.9

29.1

0.15

Disney (US)

5

0.41

8

0.57

12.4

0.03

Living Media Group

0.96

0.09

4

0.15

47.3

0.01

Eros Entertainment

0.52

0.12

2

0.16

49.2

0.01

Network18 Group

0.18

0.06

2

0.28

165.6

0.04

Murdoch Interests (US)

0.30

0.12

11

1.2

588.1

0.18

DEN Networks (50% Murdoch Interests, US)

0.00

0.13

5

0.78

N/A

0.11

Media Concentration Index

2004/5

2011 or Most Recent

% Change Annual Average

Total Revenue: Nat’l Media Industry (mil US$)

15,192

43,457

31.0%

Total Voices (n)

59

70

3.1%

Net Voices (n)

46

54

2.9%

Public Ownership (%)

44.2

22.7

–3.6%

Foreign Ownership (%)

8.0

17.1

1.5%

C4 Average—Weighted

75

80

0.80%

HHI Average—Weighted

4,906

2,935

–6.7%

C1 Average—Weighted

52

42

–2%

Noam Index Average—Weighted

3,330

1,710

–8.1%

Pooled Overall Sector C4

57.4

62.2

0.80%

Pooled Overall Sector HHI

1,387

1,140

–3.0%

Pooled Overall Sector Noam Index

160

58

–10.6

Market Share of Top Ten Companies: Nat’l Media Industry (%) (Pooled C10)

70.9

80.2

1.5%

National Power Index

4,311

2,923

–5.4%

Table 25-16. Top Content Media Companies in India

2004/5

2011 or Most Recent

% Change Annual Average

Company Power Index in Country

Company Share of the National Content Media Market (%)

Company Power Index in Country

Company Share of the National Content Media Market (%)

Company Power Index in Country

Company Share of the National Content Media Market (%)

Prasar Bharati (public)

3,097

31.3

1,191

12.3

–10.3%

–3.2

Google (US)

78

2.2

476

5.8

85.7%

0.6

Zee

34

3.1

204

8.0

83.7

0.82

BCCL (The Times of India Group)

254

9.4

308

11.5

3.5%

0.3

Tata Group

0.0

0.0

4

0.87

N/A

0.14

Sun Group (Sun Pictures, India)

15

1.1

78

3.8

0.71%

0.46%

Disney (US)

14

1.3

39

2.8

0.30

0.26

Living Media Group

3

0.27

18

0.76

86.7

0.08

Murdoch Interests (US)

1

0.38

22

2.6

3.8

0.37

Eros Entertainment

2

0.37

10

0.79

0.90

0.07

Hathway

1.8

49

3.0

0.24

0.21

DEN Networks

0.0

0.12

8

1.5

N/A

0.23

Media Concentration Index

2004/5

2011 or Most Recent

% Change Annual Average

Public Ownership (%)

31.2

12.3

–3.2%

Foreign Ownership (%)

9.0

20.4

1.9%

C4 Average—Weighted

61

66

0.76%

HHI Average—Weighted

3,814

2,673

–5.0%

C1 Average—Weighted

47

39

–1%

National Power Index

3,594

2,677

–4.3%

Table 25-17. Top Platform Media Companies in India

2004/5

2011 or Most Recent

% Change Annual Average

Company Power Index in Country

Company Share of the National PlatformMedia Market (%)

Company Power Index in Country

Company Share of the National Platform Media Market (%)

Company Power Index in Country

Company Share of the National Platform Media Market (%)

BSNL

3,977

50.5

1,510

25.4

–10.3

–4.2

Bharti Enterprises

231

12.1

801

25.5

41.1

2.2

Reliance Anil Dhirubhai Ambani Group

59

2.5

162

11.5

29.3

1.5

Vodafone (UK)

181

7.5

354

15.4

16.0

1.3

Zee

34

1.2

36

1.9

0.92

0.11

Tata Group

10

2.8

8

2.5

–3.9

.06

  • Hathway

22

2.0

25

1.7

0.03

–0.06

Den Networks

0.0

0.00

4

0.6

N/A

0.10

Media Concentration Index

2004/5

2011 or Most Recent

% Change Annual Average

Public Ownership (%)

50.5

25.4

–4.2%

Foreign Ownership (%)

7.5

16.3

1.5%

C4 Average—Weighted

82

83

0.27%

HHI Average—Weighted

5,435

3,001

–7.5%

C1 Average—Weighted

54

43

–2%

National Power Index

4,682

3,020

–5.9%

Public ownership fell substantially, from 44.2% to 22.7%. The state companies BSNL and the Broadcasting Corporation of India, also known as Prasar Bharati, had been the two top firms, bot moved down to the number two and five spots. The Indian government is particularly concerned about retaining control over the production of broadcast news content on both radio and television, which ensures that Prasar has held onto its market leadership even as it fell from 31.3% in content in 2004 to 12.3% in 2009. Substantive restrictions for foreign direct investment are present in both content and platform media. A total of 17.1% of media industries are foreign-owned, largely due to mobile provider Vodafone’s presence (UK).

The Times of India Group is the most diverse content company, with 29.2% of daily newspapers, 2.18% of radio, and 23.7% of online news media, and smaller shares in video channels and magazines. It controls 11.5% of the content media market (Table 25.16), while in the overall media market the presence of the telecom (p.796) (p.797) (p.798) (p.799) (p.800) companies reduces its share to 2.3%. Zee Entertainment holds significant shares in video channels (30%) and multichannel platforms (19.4%), which amount to 8.0% of the overall national market and make it the third largest content producer in India. Several content producers had high growth rates based on expansion and entry from some of India’s largest industrial conglomerates, such as the Tata Group, Bharti Enterprises, and Reliance Industries, that have been buying into the mobile telecom sector in particular.

Notes:

(1.) ETV has traditionally dominated Telegu-language programming in South India, the ABP Group is strongest in the Bengali-language print market, and Zee Bangla and ETV Bangla dominate the Bengali-language audiovisual market. Nationally, NDTV and Network18 offer programming in English and Hindi, while Zee offers programming primarily in Hindi but also adds 12 regional languages as well as English through a joint venture with Time Warner (US).

(2.) Ipsos. “India Pulse.” Mumbai: Ipsos, 2012. Feb. 18, 2013. <http://www.ipsos.com/sites/ipsos.com/files/India%20Pulse%20-%20October%202012.pdf>.

(3.) “Industry and Services: Media and Entertainment.” New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India Investment & Technology Promotion (ITP) Division, 2009. May 10, 2012. <http://www.indiainbusiness.nic.in/industry-infrastructure/service-sectors/media-entertainment.htm>

(4.) Khanna, T. and Palepu, K. “The Evolution of Concentrated Ownership in India: Broad Patterns and a History of the Indian Software Industry.” Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004. June 14, 2012. <http://www.nber.org/papers/w10613>.

(5.) Kohli-Khandekar, Vanita. “When Politicians Own the Media.” Business Standard, July 3, 2012. Feb. 20, 2013. <http://business-standard.com/india/news/vanita-kohli-khandekar-when-politicians-ownmedia/479159/>.

(6.) Khanna, T. and Palepu, K. “The Evolution of Concentrated Ownership in India: Broad patterns and a History of the Indian Software Industry.” Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004. June 14, 2012. <http://www.nber.org/papers/w10613>.

(7.) Kohli-Khandekar, Vanita. “When Politicians Own the Media.” Business Standard, July 3, 2012. Feb. 18, 2013. <http://business-standard.com/india/news/vanita-kohli-khandekar-when-politicians-ownmedia/479159/>.

(8.) Khanna, T. and Palepu, K. “The Evolution of Concentrated Ownership in India: Broad Patterns and a History of the Indian Software Industry.” Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004. June 14, 2012. <http://www.nber.org/papers/w10613>.

(9.) Shukla, Archana. “With FIR, Jindal gives police tapes of ‘meetings’ with Zee.” Indian Express, Oct. 12, 2012. Oct. 25, 2012. <http://www.indianexpress.com/news/with-fir-jindal-gives-police-tapes-of--meetings--with-zee/1015622>.

(10.) Singh, Prabhakar; Regional Head, Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy. Personal interview with Anuradha Bhattacharjee. May 24, 2012.

(11.) Manoj, C G. “TRAI against govt entering broadcast, distribution.” The Indian Express, Dec. 29, 2012. Dec. 29, 2012. <http://www.indianexpress.com/news/trai-against-govt-entering-broadcast-distribution/1051593/>.

(12.) Subramanian, N. Sundaresha. “RIL Controls Network18 Group Indirectly, says CCI.” Business Standard, June 23, 2012. June 23, 2012. <http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/ril-controls-network18-group-indirectly-says-cci/478250/>.

(13.) Tata Communications: About. tatacommunications.com, 2012. June 28, 2012. <http://www.tatacommunications.com/about/network.asp>.

(14.) “Reliance Communications Annual Report 2010-11.” Hyderabad: Reliance Communications, 2011. Jan. 16, 2012. <http://www.bseindia.com/bseplus/AnnualReport/532712/5327120311.pdf>.

(15.) After Dhirubhai Ambani, the founder of Reliance Industries, passed away on July 6, 2002, his sons, Mukesh Ambani and Anil Ambani, split Reliance Industries. Anil Ambani became head of Reliance Infocomm, Reliance Energy, Reliance Capital and RNRL under the brand of Reliance ADAG. In December 2011, Reliance ADAG rejoined Reliance Industries.

(16.) Beck, Sanderson. “British India 1818–1875.” India & Southeast Asia to 1875. Santa Barbara: World Peace Communications, 2004. <http://wiki.phalkefactory.net/images/f/fc/British_India_1818-1875.pdf>.

(17.) Kohli-Khandekar, Vanita. The Indian Media Business. 2nd ed. New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 2006. 24.

(18.) Khanna, T. and Palepu, K. “The Evolution of Concentrated Ownership in India: Broad Patterns and a History of the Indian Software Industry.” Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004. June 14, 2012. <http://www.nber.org/papers/w10613>.

(19.) Kohli-Khandekar, Vanita. The Indian Media Business. 2nd ed. New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 2006. 24–25.

(20.) “NRS 2006—Key Findings.” The Hindu, 2006. Feb. 21, 2013. <http://www.hindu.com/nic/nrs.htm>.

(21.) Mitra, Chandan; Managing Editor, The Pioneer. Personal interview with Anuradha Bhattacharjee. May 24, 2007.

(22.) Indian Readership Survey (IRS). IRS Q4 2010 Topline Findings. Mumbai: Media Research Users Council, 2012. Feb. 18, 2012. <http://www.pdfone.com/download/11_meri-saheli-hindi/irs-2010-q4-topline-findings-hansa-research-market-research.html>.

(23.) Indian Readership Survey (IRS). IRS Q2 2011 Topline Findings. Mumbai: Media Research Users Council, 2012. Feb. 21, 2013. <http://mruc.net/irs2011q2-topline-finding.pdf>.

(24.) Indian Readership Survey (IRS). IRS Q1 2012 Topline Findings. Mumbai: Media Research Users Council, 2012. Feb. 18, 2013. <http://mruc.net/irs2012q1-topline-findings.pdf>.

(25.) Audit Bureau of Circulation. “January-June 2010.” Mumbai: Audit Bureau of Circulation, 2010. & Audit Bureau of Circulation. “July-December 2010.” Mumbai: Audit Bureau of Circulation, 2010.

(26.) Indian Readership Survey (IRS). IRS Q2 2011 Topline Findings. Mumbai: Media Research Users Council, 2012. Feb. 21, 2013. <http://mruc.net/irs2011q2-topline-finding.pdf>.

(27.) ABP: Mjoy. abp.in, 2011. Aug. 2, 2011. <http://www.abp.in/index.php?show=22002>.

(28.) Malhotra, Dina N. “The Panorama of Indian Book Publishing.” 60 Years of Book Publishing in India, 1947–2007. Malhotra, Dina N., ed. New Delhi: Federation of Indian Book Publishers, 2006. 14.

(29.) Malhotra, Dina N. “The Panorama of Indian Book Publishing.” 60 Years of Book Publishing in India, 1947–2007. Malhotra, Dina N., ed. New Delhi: Federation of Indian Book Publishers, 2006. 10–11.

(30.) Kaul H. K. “Role of Books in National Development.” 60 Years of Book Publishing in India, 1947–2007. Malhotra, Dina N., ed. New Delhi: Federation of Indian Publishers, 2006. 202.

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(32.) Singh, T. “Publishing in English.” 60 Years of Book Publishing in India, 1947–2007. Malhotra, Dina N., ed. New Delhi: Federation of Indian Publishers, 2006. 57.

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(34.) Audit Bureau of Circulation. “January-June 2010.” Mumbai: Audit Bureau of Circulation, 2010. & Audit Bureau of Circulation. “July-December 2010.” Mumbai: Audit Bureau of Circulation, 2010.

(35.) Centre for Monitoring of Indian Economy (CMIE). cmie.com, 2012. July 8, 2012. <http://www.cmie.com/>.

(36.) May, Mumbai. “Aditya Birla Group Acquires Stake in Living Media India.” Business Standard, 19 May 2012. May 19, 2012. <http://business-standard.com/india/news/aditya-birla-group-acquires-stake-in-living-media-india/474783/>.

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(39.) KPMG and FICCI. “Hitting the High Notes: FICCI-KPMG Indian Media and Entertainment Industry Report 2011.” kmpg.com, 2011. Feb. 18, 2013. <http://www.kpmg.com/IN/en/IssuesAndInsights/ThoughtLeadership/FICCI-KPMG-Report-2011.pdf>. 16.

(40.) Kohli-Khandekar, Vanita. The Indian Media Business. 3rd ed. New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 2010. 80.

(41.) LCOs operate as monopolists or duopolists within a small geographical region, usually not much larger than a major metropolitan area, which partly explains the highly fragmented nature of the industry.

(42.) PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC). “PwC India Entertainment and Media Outlook 2011.” New Delhi: PwC India, 2011. Feb. 18, 2013. <http://www.pwc.in/en_IN/in/assets/pdfs/publications-2011/India_Entertainment_and_Media_Outlook_2011.pdf>.

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(44.) Kohli-Khandekar, Vanita. The Indian Media Business. 3rd ed. New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 2010. 80.

(45.) 2012 update provided by editors. Data from Media Partners Asia 2013 DTH industry study and forecast report.

(46.) Sun TV Channel. Sun Group, 2009. July 5, 2012. <http://www.sun.in/television.aspx>.

(47.) “Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited Annual Report 2011-2012.” Mumbai: Zee, 2012. Dec. 27, 2012. <http://vidz.zeecdn.com/zeetele/pdfs/zeear2011-2121-e72d9565b5c91b6.pdf>.

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(49.) NDTV. New Delhi: NDTV Convergence Limited, 2010. Oct. 25, 2010. <http://www.ndtv.com/convergence/ndtv/corporatepage/index.aspx>.

(50.) Network18. “Annual Report: 2011–2012.” New Delhi: Network18, 2012. Dec. 27, 2012. <http://www.network18online.com/reports/AnnualReportFinal210812.pdf>.

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(53.) MCCS was dissolved in 2012.

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(58.) Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI). “Point of Interconnection (POIs) Congestion report of the Cellular Mobile Telephone Service Providers (CMTS) and Basic Telephone Service (Wireline) Providers for the months of October, November & December 2011.” TRAI, 2012. Feb. 12, 2012. <http://www.trai.gov.in/WriteReadData/PIRReport/Documents/NW-report-December11.pdf>. 4.

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(66.) “Investors.” rediff.com, 2012. July 4, 2012. <http://investor.rediff.com/>.

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