Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Semantic PerceptionHow the Illusion of a Common Language Arises and Persists$

Jody Azzouni

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199967407

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199967407.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2017. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: null; date: 30 March 2017

(p.355) BIBLIOGRAPHY

(p.355) BIBLIOGRAPHY

Source:
Semantic Perception
Publisher:
Oxford University Press

Bibliography references:

Anscombe, G.E.M. 1965. The intentionality of sensation: A grammatical feature. In Metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, volume two, The collected papers of G.E.M. Anscombe (1981), 3–20. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

———. 2000. Intention. 2nd edition. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. (2nd edition published 1963.)

Armour-Garb, Bradley. 2007. Consistent inconsistency theories. Inquiry 50(6): 639–654.

Austin, J.L. 1962. Sense and sensibilia. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Azzouni, Jody. 1994. Metaphysical myths, mathematical practice: The ontology and epistemology of the exact sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2000a. Knowledge and reference in empirical science. London: Routledge. (Paperback edition—with important corrections—published in 2004.)

———. 2000b. Applying mathematics: An attempt to design a philosophical problem. Monist 83(2): 209–227.

———. 2003a. The strengthened liar, the expressive strength of natural languages, and regimentation. Philosophical Forum 34(3–4): 329–350.

———. 2003b. Individuation, causal relations, and Quine. In Meaning, edited by Mark Richard, 197–219. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd.

———. 2004a. Proof and ontology in mathematics. In New trends in the history and philosophy of mathematics, edited by Tinne Hoff Kjeldsen, Stig Andur Pedersen, and Lise Mariane Sonne-Hansen, 117–133. Denmark: University Press of Southern Denmark.

———. 2004b. Deflating existential consequence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. 2004c. Theory, observation and scientific realism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55: 371–392. (p.356)

———. 2005. Is there still a sense in which mathematics can have foundations? In Essays on the foundations of mathematics and logic, edited by G. Sica, 9–47. Italy: Polimetrica.

———. 2006. Tracking reason: Proof, consequence and truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. 2007. Ontological commitment in the vernacular. Noûs 41(2): 204–226.

———. 2008a. The compulsion to believe: Logical inference and normativity. ProtoSociology 25: 69–88.

———. 2008b. Alternative logics, and the role of truth in the interpretation of languages. In New essays on Tarski and philosophy, edited by Douglas Patterson, 390–429. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. 2009a. Evading truth commitments: The problem reanalyzed. Logique et analyse 206: 139–176.

———. 2009b. Why do informal proofs conform to formal norms? Foundations of Science 14: 9–26.

———. 2010a. Talking about nothing: Numbers, hallucinations, and fictions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. 2010b. Ontology and the word “exist”: Uneasy relations. Philosophia mathematica (III) 18: 74–101.

———. 2010c. The rule-following paradox and the impossibility of private rule-following. The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication, North America 5, thebaliticyearbook.org/journals/baltic/issue/view/4.

———. Forthcoming. Taking the easy road out of Dodge. Mind.

Bach, Kent. 1987. Thought and reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. 1992a. Intentions and demonstrations. Analysis 52: 140–146.

———. 1992b. Paving the road to reference. Philosophical Studies 67: 295–300.

———. 1994a. Semantic slack. In Foundations of speech act theory, edited by Savas Tsohatzidis, 267–291. London: Routledge.

———. 1994b. Conversational implicature. Mind and language 9: 124–162.

———. 1994c. Postscript. In Thought and reference (paperback edition, 1994), 302–319. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. 2001. You don’t say? Synthese 128: 15–44.

———. 2005. Context ex machina. In Semantics versus pragmatics, edited by Zoltán Gendler Szabó, 15–44. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bach, Kent, and Robert M. Harnish. 1979. Linguistic communication and speech acts. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Baldwin, Dare. 1991. Infant contribution to the achievement of joint reference. Child Development 62: 129–154.

Barwise, Jon, and John Perry. 1983. Situations and attitudes. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Bezuidenhout, A. 2002. Truth-conditional pragmatics. Philosophical Perspectives 16: 105–134.

Boolos, George. 1998. Must we believe in set theory? In Logic, logic, and logic, edited by Richard Jeffrey, 120–132. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Bromberger, Sylvain. 1992. Types and tokens in linguistics. In On what we know we don’t know, 170–208. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Burge, Tyler. 1975. On knowledge and convention. In Foundations of mind (2007), 32–37. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (p.357)

———. 1979. Individualism and the mental. In Foundations of mind (2007), 100–150. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. 1982a. Other bodies. In Foundations of mind (2007), 82–99. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. 1982b. Two thought experiments reviewed. In Foundations of mind (2007), 182–191. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. 2003. Social anti-individualism, objective reference. In Foundations of mind (2007), 307–315. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. 2005. Introduction. In Truth, thought, reason: Essays on Frege, 1–68. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. 2007. Foundations of mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cappelen, Herman, and Ernie Lepore. 1997. On an alleged connection between indirect speech and the theory of meaning. Mind & Language 12: 278–296.

———. 2005. Insensitive semantics: A defense of semantic minimalism and speech act pluralism. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Carey, Susan. 2009a. The origin of concepts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. 2009b. Where our number concepts come from. Journal of Philosophy 106(4): 220–254.

Carston, Robyn. 1988. Implicature, explicature, and truth-theoretic semantics. In Mental Representations: The interface between language and reality, edited by R. Kempson, 155–181. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2002. Thought and utterances: The pragmatics of explicit communication. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Cartwright, Richard. 1987. Propositions. In Philosophical essays, 33–53. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Chang, Hasok. 2004. Inventing temperature: Measurement and scientific progress. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chierchia, Gennaro, and Sally McConnell-Ginet. 1990. Meaning and grammar: An introduction to semantics. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Chihara, Charles S. 2004. A structural account of mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chomsky, Noam. 1986. Knowledge of language: Its nature, origin, and use. New York: Praeger.

———. 1993. Language and thought. Wakefield, R.I.: Moyer Bell.

———. 1995. The minimalist program. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

———. 2000a. New horizons in the study of language. In New horizons in the study of language and mind, 3–18. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2000b. Explaining language use. In New horizons in the study of language and mind, 19–45. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2000c. Language and interpretation: Philosophical reflections and empirical inquiry. In New horizons in the study of language and mind, 46–74. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2000d. Language as a natural object. In New horizons in the study of language and mind, 106–133. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2000e. Language from an internalist perspective. In New horizons in the study of language and mind, 134–163. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2000f. Internalist explorations. In New horizons in the study of language and mind, 164–194. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (p.358)

———. 2003a. Reply to Millikan. In Chomsky and his critics, edited by Louise Antony and Norbert Hornstein, 308–315. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

———. 2003b. Reply to Ludlow. In Chomsky and his critics, edited by Louise Antony and Norbert Hornstein, 287–295. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Churchland, Paul M. 1979. Scientific realism and the plasticity of mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 1988. Perceptual plasticity and theoretical neutrality: A reply to Jerry Fodor. Philosophy of Science 55: 167–187.

Cohen, L.J. 1971. Some remarks on Grice’s views about the logical particles of natural language. In Pragmatics of natural language, edited by Y. Bar-Hillel, 50–68. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Cohl, H. Aaron (compiler). 1997. The friars’ club encyclopedia of jokes. New York: Black Dog & Leventhal Publishers.

Collins, John. 2009. Methodology, not metaphysics: Against semantic externalism. Aristotelian Society 83: 53–69.

———. 2011. The unity of linguistic meaning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Corballis, Michael C. 2002. From hand to mouth: The origins of language. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Cummins, Robert. 1998. Reflection on reflective equilibrium. In Rethinking intuition: The psychology of intuition and its role in philosophical inquiry, edited by Michael R. DePaul and William Ramsey, 113–127. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Davidson, Donald. 1965. Theories of meaning and learnable languages. In Inquiries into truth and interpretation (1984), 3–15. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. 1974. On the very idea of a conceptual scheme. In Inquiries into truth and interpretation (1984), 183–198. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. 1984. Inquiries into truth and interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. 1986. A nice derangements of epitaphs. In Truth and interpretation: Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, edited by Ernest LePore, 433–446. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd.

———. 1990. The second person. MS University of California, Berkeley.

———. 1992. The second person. In Subjective, intersubjective, objective (2001), 107–121. Oxford: Oxford University Press,

Dehaene, Stanislas. 1997. The number sense: How the mind creates mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dehaene, Stanislas, Manuela Piazza, Philippe Pinel, and Laurent Cohen. 2003. Three parietal circuits for number processing. Cognitive Neuropsychology 20(3–6): 487–506.

Dennett, Daniel C. 1987. Evolution, error, and intentionality. In The intentional stance, 287–321. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

———. 1991. Consciousness explained. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

DePaul, Michael R., and William Ramsey. 1998. Rethinking intuition: The psychology of intuition and its role in philosophical inquiry. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Donnellan, Keith 1966. Reference and definite descriptions. In The philosophy of language (1990), edited by A.P. Martinich, 235–247.

———. 1978. Speaker reference, descriptions and anaphora. Syntax and Semantics 9: 47–68.

Dummett, Michael. 1978. Truth and other enigmas. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. (p.359)

———. 1986. A nice derangements of epitaphs: Some comments on Davidson and Hacking. In Truth and interpretation: Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, edited by Ernest LePore, 459–476. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd.

Epstein, Brian. 2009. Grounds, convention, and the metaphysics of linguistic tokens. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 9(25), 45–67.

Fauconnier, Gilles. 1985. Mental spaces. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Feynman, Richard. 1985. The strange theory of light and matter. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Field, Hartry. 1980. Science without numbers. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Fitzpatrick, Jennifer, and Linda R. Wheeldon. 2000. Phonology and phonetics in psycholinguistic models of speech perception. In Phonological knowledge: Conceptual and empirical issues, edited by Noel Burton-Roberts, Philip Carr, and Gerard Docherty, 131–160. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fodor, Jerry A. 1981. The present status of the innateness controversy. In Representations, 257–316. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

———. 1983. The modularity of mind. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

———. 1998. Concepts: Where cognitive science went wrong. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Frege, Gottlob. 1884. The foundations of arithmetic (1980), trans. J.L. Austin. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press.

———. 1892. On sense and reference. In Meaning (2003), edited by Mark Richard, 36–56. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd.

García-Carpintero, Manuel. 2001. Gricean rational reconstructions and the semantics/pragmatics distinction. Synthese 128: 93–131.

Gazdar, Gerald. 1979. Pragmatics, implicature, presupposition and logical form. London: Academic Press.

Gibbs, Raymond. 1994. The poetics of mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gibbs, Raymond, and Jessica Moise. 1997. Pragmatics in understanding what is said. Cognition 62: 51–74.

Goldman, Alvin and Joel Pust. 1998. Philosophical theory and intuitional evidence. In Rethinking intuition: The psychology of intuition and its role in philosophical inquiry, edited by Michael R. DePaul and William Ramsey, 179–197. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Goodman, Nelson. 1965. Fact, fiction and forecast. New York: Bobbs-Merrill.

Grandin, Temple, and Catherine Johnson. 2005. Animals in translation. New York: Harcourt, Inc.

Gregory, Richard L. 1980. Perceptions as hypotheses. In Vision and mind, edited by Alva Noë and Evan Thompson, 111–133 (2002). Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Grice, Paul. 1989a. Logic and conversation. In Studies in the way of words, 2–137. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

———. 1989b. Retrospective epilogue. In Studies in the way of words, 339–385. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

———. 1989c. Meaning. In Studies in the way of words, 213–223. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Hacking, Ian. 1986. The parody of conversation. In Truth and interpretation: Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, edited by Ernest LePore, 459–476. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd. (p.360)

Hardin, C.L. 1988. Color for philosophers: Unweaving the rainbow. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.

Hawthorne, John. 2004. Knowledge and lotteries. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Higginbotham, James. 1985. On semantics. Linguistic Inquiry 16: 547–594.

———. 1993. Grammatical form and logical form. In Philosophical perspectives 7: Language and logic, edited by James E. Tomberlin, 173–196. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Company.

Hirsch, Eli. 1988. Strange thoughts of the third kind. In Midwest studies in philosophy 12, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, 3–24. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Hochberg, J. 1974. Higher-order stimuli and inter-response coupling in the perception of the visual world. In Perception: Essays in honor of J. J. Gibson, edited by R.B. MacLeod and H.L. Pick, 17–39. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Holmes, Frederic L., and Trevor H. Levere (eds.). 2000. Instruments and experimentation in the history of chemistry. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Horn, Laurence R. 1972. On the semantic properties of logical operators in English. Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles.

———. 2001. A natural history of negation (reissue ed.). Stanford, Calif.: CSLI Publications.

———. 2004. Implicature. In The handbook of pragmatics, edited by L.R. Horn and G. Ward, 3–28. Oxford: Blackwell.

Horstein, Norbert. 1984. Logic as grammar. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Hurley, Susan, and Nick Chater (eds.). 2005. Perspectives on imitation: From neuroscience to social science. Vol. 1: Mechanisms of imitation and imitation in animals. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Iacoboni, Marco. 2005. Understanding others: Imitation, language, and empathy. In Perspectives on imitation: From neuroscience to social science. Vol. 1: Mechanisms of imitation and imitation in animals, edited by Susan Hurley and Nick Chater, 77–99. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Johnson, Kent. 2007. The legacy of methodological dualism. Mind & Language 22(4): 366–401.

Kaplan, David. 1978. Dthat. In Readings in the philosophy of language (1997), edited by Peter Ludlow, 669–692. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press..

———. 1989a. Demonstratives. In Themes from Kaplan, edited by Joseph Almog, John Perry, and Howard Wettstein, 481–563. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. 1989b. Afterthoughts. In Themes from Kaplan, edited by Joseph Almog, John Perry, and Howard Wettstein, 565–614. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Katz, Jerrold J. 1972. Semantic theory. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers.

———. 1977. Propositional structure and illocutionary force: A study of the contribution of sentence meaning to speech acts. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Katz, Jerrold, J., and Jerry A. Fodor. 1963. The structure of a semantic theory. Language 39(2), part I: 170–210.

Kennedy, C., and Jason Stanley. 2009. On “average.” Mind 118: 583–646.

Kleene, S.C. 1971. Introduction to metamathematics. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

Kline, Morris. 1972. Mathematical thought from ancient to modern times. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Koslicki, Kathrin. 1999. Genericity and logical form. Mind and Language 14(4): 441–467.

Kripke, Saul. 1977. Speaker’s reference and semantic reference. In The philosophy of language (1990), edited by A.P. Martinich, 248–267. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (p.361)

———. 1980. Naming and necessity. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Kuhn, Thomas S. 1970. The structure of scientific revolutions, second edition, enlarged. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Lakatos, Imre. 1976. Proofs and refutations: The logic of mathematical discovery. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lear, Jonathan. 1982. Aristotle’s philosophy of mathematics. Philosophical Review 91: 161–192.

Lemer, Cathy, Stanislas Dehaene, Elizabeth Spelke, and Laurent Cohen. 2003. Approximate quantities and exact number words: Dissociable systems. Neuropsychologia 4: 1942–1958.

Levinson, Stephen C. 2000. Presumptive meanings: The theory of generalized conversational implicatures. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Lewis, David. 1968. Convention. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

———. 1972. Languages and language. In Philosophical papers, vol. 1, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1983), 163–188.

———. 1979. Scorekeeping in a language game.In Philosophical Papers, vol. 1, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1983), 233–249.

Loar, Brian. 1981. Mind and meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ludlow, Peter. 2003. Referential semantics for I-languages? In Chomsky and his critics, edited by Louise M. Anthony and Norbert Hornstein, 140–161. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

MacKenzie, Donald. 2001. Mechanizing proof: Computing, risk, and trust. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Mackie, J.L. 1974. The cement of the universe: A study of causation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Malvern, Lawrence E. 1969. Introduction to the mechanics of a continuous medium. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.

Marr, David. 1982. Vision. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman.

Mill, J.S. 1843. A system of logic. London: Longmans Green.

Miller, P.E., and C.J. Murphy. 1995. Vision in dogs. Journal of the American Veterinary Medical Association 12: 1623–1634.

Milner, A. David, and Melvyn A. Goodale. 1995. The visual brain in action. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Naber, Gregory L. 1992. The geometry of Minkowski spacetime. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.

Nagel, Thomas. 1986. The view from nowhere. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Neale, Stephen. 1999. Coloring and composition. In Philosophy and linguistics, edited by K. Murasugi and R. Stainton, 35–82. Boulder, Colo.: Westview.

Peirce, Charles Sanders. 1906/1960. Prolegomena to an apology for pragmaticism. In Collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce 3–4, edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, 411–463. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Pietroski, P.M. 2005. Meaning before truth. In Contextualism in philosophy, edited by Gerhard Preyer and Georg Peter, 255–302. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Plato. 1961a. Phaedo. In The collected dialogues of Plato, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, 40–98. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

———. 1961b. Euthyphro. In The collected dialogues of Plato, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, 169–185. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Putnam, Hilary. 1970. Is semantics possible? In Mind, language and reality: Philosophical papers 2, 139–152. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (p.362)

———. 1975. The meaning of “meaning.” In Mind, language and reality: Philosophical papers 2, 215–271. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 1981. Reason, truth and history. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pylyshyn, Zenon W. 2003. Seeing and visualizing: It’s not what you think. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

———. 2007. Things and places: How the mind connects with the world. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Quine, W.V. 1953a. On what there is. In From a logical point of view (1980), 1–19. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

———. 1953b. Two dogmas of empiricism. In From a logical point of view (1980), 20–46. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

———. 1953c. Identity, ostension, and hypostasis. In From a logical point of view (1980), 65–79. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press

———. 1960a. Word and object. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

———. 1960b. Carnap and logical truth. In The ways of paradox and other essays, revised and enlarged edition (1976), 107–132. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

———. 1981a. What price bivalence? In Theories and things, 31–37. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

———. 1981b. Responses. In Theories and things, 173–186. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

———. 1986. Philosophy of logic, 2nd ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Rav, Y. 2007. A critique of a formalist-mechanist version of the justification of arguments in mathematicians’ proof practices. Philosophia Mathematica 15(3): 291–320.

Rawls, John. 1971. A theory of justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

———. 1974. The independence of moral theory. Proceedings and addresses of the American Philosophical Association 48: 4–22.

Recanati, François. 1987. Contextual dependence and definite descriptions. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87: 57–73.

———. 1989. The pragmatics of what is said. Mind and Language 4: 295–229.

———. 1993. Direct reference: From language to thought. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.

———. 1994. Contextualism and anti-contextualism in the philosophy of language. In Foundations of speech act theory, edited by S. Tsohatzidis, 156–166. London: Routledge.

———. 1995. The alleged priority of literal intepretation. Cognitive Science 19: 207–232.

———. 1999. Situations and the structure of content. In Philosophy and linguistics, edited by Kumiko Murasugi and Robert Stainton, 113–165. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

———. 2001. What is said. Synthese 128: 75–91.

———. 2004. Literal meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2005. Literalism and contextualism: Some varieties. In Contextualism in philosophy, edited by Gerhard Preyer and Georg Peter, 171–196. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Reimer, Marga. 1991a. Do demonstrations have semantic significance? Analysis 51: 177–183.

———. 1991b. Demonstratives, demonstrations, and demonstrata. Philosophical Studies 63: 187–202.

———. 1992. Three views of demonstrative reference. Synthese 93: 373–402. (p.363)

———. 1997. “Competing” semantic theories. Noûs 31(4): 457–477.

Rizzolatti, Giacomo. 2005. The mirror neuron system and imitation. In Perspectives on imitation: From neuroscience to social science. Vol. 1: Mechanisms of imitation and imitation in animals, edited by Susan Hurley and Nick Chater, 55–76. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Rock, Irvin. 1974. The perception of disoriented figures. Scientific American 230(1): 78–85.

Rock, Irvin (ed.). 1997. Indirect perception. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Rosch, E., and C. Mervis. 1975. Family resemblances: studies in the internal structure of categories. In Rethinking intuition: The psychology of intuition and its role in philosophical inquiry, edited by Michael R. DePaul and William Ramsey, 17–44. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Russell, Bertrand. 1912. The problems of philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. 1995. An inquiry into meaning and truth, rev. ed. Oxon: Routledge.

Salmon, Nathan. 1991. The pragmatic fallacy. Philosophical Studies 63: 83–97.

Samuels, R., S.P. Stich, and S. Nichols. 1999. Rethinking rationality: From bleak implications to Darwinian modules. In What is cognitive science? edited by E. Lepore and Z. Pylyshyn, 74–120. London: Blackwell.

Sanford, A.J., and Linda M. Moxley. 2004. Exploring quantifiers: Pragmatics meets the psychology of comprehension. In Experimental pragmatics, edited by Ira A. Noveck and Dan Sperber, 116–137. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Sauerland, Uli, and Kazuko Yatsushiro (eds.). 2009. Semantics and pragmatics: From experiment to theory. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Schiffer, Stephen. 1982. Intention-based semantics. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23(2): 119–156.

———. 1987. Remnants of meaning. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

———. 1988a. Introduction to the paperback edition. In Meaning, xi–xxix. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. 1988b. Meaning. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Originally published 1972.)

Schiffman, Harvey Richard. 2001. Sensation and perception: An integrated approach, 5th ed. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Searle, John R. 1965. What is a speech act? In Philosophy in America, edited by Max Black, 221–239. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

———. 1969. Speech acts: An essay in the philosophy of language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 1980. The background of meaning. In Speech act theory and pragmatics, edited by John Searle, F. Keifer, and M. Bierwisch, 221–232. Dordrecht: Reidel.

———. 1992. The rediscovery of the mind. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Seckel, Al. 2003. Incredible visual illusions. London: Arcturus Publishing Limited.

Shafir, Eldar. 1998. Philosophical intuitions and cognitive mechanisms. In Rethinking intuition: The psychology of intuition and its role in philosophical inquiry, edited by Michael R. DePaul and William Ramsey, 59–73. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Siegel, Susanna. 2002. The role of perception in demonstrative reference. Philosophers’ Imprint 2(1):1–21.

Smith, A.D. 2002. The problem of perception. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Soames, Scott. 2005. Naming and asserting. In Semantics versus pragmatics, edited by Zoltán Gendler Szabó, 356–382. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (p.364)

Spelke, Elizabeth. 1988. Where perceiving ends and thinking begins: The apprehension of objects in infancy. In Perceptual development in infancy, edited by A. Yonas, 196–230. London: Psychology Press.

———. 1990. Principles of object perception. Cognitive Science 14: 29–56.

———. 1998. Nativism, empiricism, and the origins of knowledge. Infant Behavior & Development 21(2): 181–200.

Sperber, Dan, and Ira A. Noveck. 2004. “Introduction.” In Experimental pragmatics, 1–22. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Sperber, Dan, and Deirdre Wilson. 1986. Relevance. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Stanley, Jason. 2000. Context and logical form. Linguistics and Philosophy 23: 391–434.

———. 2004. Review of Literal meaning by François Recanati. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, ndpr.nd.edu/news/24857-literal-meaning/.

Stich, S. 1978. Beliefs and subdoxastic states. Philosophy of Science 45: 499–518.

Strawson, P.F. 1971a. Identifying reference and truth-values. In Logico-linguistic papers, 75–95. London: Methuen & Co Ltd.

———. 1971b. Intention and convention in speech acts. In Logico-linguistic papers, 149–169. London: Methuen & Co Ltd.

Strobel, Howard A., and William R. Heineman. 1989. Chemical instrumentation: A systematic approach, 3d ed. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Thau, Michael. 2002. Consciousness and cognition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1953. Philosophical investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. New York: Macmillan Company.

Wettstein, Howard. 1981. Demonstrative reference and definite descriptions. In Has semantics rested on a mistake? And other essays, 35–49. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.

Wright, Crispin. 1992. Truth and objectivity. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Ziff, Paul. 1960. Semantic analysis. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.