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Worldviews of Aspiring PowersDomestic Foreign Policy Debates in China, India, Iran, Japan and Russia$
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Henry R. Nau and Deepa Ollapally

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199937479

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199937479.001.0001

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Hugging and Hedging

Hugging and Hedging

Japanese Grand Strategy in the Twenty-First Century

Chapter:
(p.146) 5 Hugging and Hedging
Source:
Worldviews of Aspiring Powers
Author(s):

Narushige Michishita

Richard J. Samuels

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199937479.003.0005

This chapter examines the Japanese foreign and security policy discourse. It identifies four distinct schools of thought, each with a different structural preference for the United States–Japan–China strategic triangle. Those who would hedge against Chinese regional economic dominance are called “bandwagoners.” They prefer Sino–Japanese ties that are closer than either United States–Japan or Sino–United States ties. Those who would hedge against Chinese military power are labeled “balancers.” They prefer a strategic environment in which United States–Japan ties remain more intimate that either Sino–United States or Sino–Japanese ties. The strategic preference of the “self-hedgers”—a group that comprises “autonomists” on the left and right—is for both Sino–Japanese and United States–Japanese ties to be closer than Sino–United States ties, with each more distant than they are at present. Finally, there is a group of “dual hedgers” who wish for a fuller integration of United States–Japanese–Chinese relations. These strategists prefer the sort of “equilateral” strategic triangle first openly described by Ozawa Ichirō in 2006.

Keywords:   foreign policy, international relations, United States, China, security policy

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