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The Value of Living Well$
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Mark LeBar

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199931118

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199931118.001.0001

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Respect for Others

Respect for Others

Chapter:
(p.305) 12 Respect for Others
Source:
The Value of Living Well
Author(s):

Mark LeBar

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199931118.003.0012

This chapter argues that the Aristotelian framework for ends, coupled with Virtue Eudaimonism’s constructivism, can remedy what has been taken to be a fatal deficit for virtue ethical theories, which is how it provides the right reasons for respecting other persons. If this is right, then the sort of eudaimonism sketched in this book is at least sufficient (if not necessary) for the plausibility of virtue ethical theories of the sort modeled on the ancient Greek accounts. It also points the way to an exploration of useful complementarities between such theories and contractualist accounts of a certain subset of our practical reasons, namely, those that directly bear on others and their interests (as proposed by T. M. Scanlon).

Keywords:   accountability, second-personal reasons, Darwall, Thomson, Strawson, Feinberg, Scanlon, justice, rights, respect, Kant, wrong kind of reason

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