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The Value of Living Well$
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Mark LeBar

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199931118

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199931118.001.0001

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The Value of Living Well
Author(s):

Mark LeBar

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199931118.003.0011

This chapter considers two major concerns about justification within and for Virtue Eudaimonism. The first is whether the sort of constructivism and response-dependence defended in previous chapters can withstand deep concerns about ultimate theoretical justification, along the lines of the dilemma posed in Plato’s Euthyphro, and related dilemmas posed by Russ Shafer-Landau and Mark Timmons. This is in one form or another a worry about the circularity of the account. The other concern is over the plausibility of the moral psychology required by Virtue Eudaimonism, and in particular whether Aristotle’s belief that the virtuous person acts “for the sake of the fine and noble” can withstand worries that it attributes the wrong reasons and motives to virtuous action.

Keywords:   circularity, Euthyphro problem, Timmons, Shafer-Landau, constructivism, Cuneo

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