This chapter considers two major concerns about justification within and for Virtue Eudaimonism. The first is whether the sort of constructivism and response-dependence defended in previous chapters can withstand deep concerns about ultimate theoretical justification, along the lines of the dilemma posed in Plato’s Euthyphro, and related dilemmas posed by Russ Shafer-Landau and Mark Timmons. This is in one form or another a worry about the circularity of the account. The other concern is over the plausibility of the moral psychology required by Virtue Eudaimonism, and in particular whether Aristotle’s belief that the virtuous person acts “for the sake of the fine and noble” can withstand worries that it attributes the wrong reasons and motives to virtuous action.
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