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Reference and Existence
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Reference and Existence: The John Locke Lectures

Saul A. Kripke

Abstract

According to the Frege-Russell paradigm, the name ‘Nixon’ refers to its bearer in virtue of an associated description, one that picks out Nixon by uniquely characterizing him. An earlier monograph, Naming and Necessity, argued that this approach was “wrong from the fundamentals,” replacing it with a picture that emphasizes the causal-historical link between a name and its bearer: an utterance of ‘Nixon’ refers to Nixon not in virtue of an identifying description, but in virtue of facts about its genealogy. A seemingly powerful objection to this view invokes fictional reference. Here, it seems, ... More

Keywords: existence, definite description, fictional entity, name, pretense, proposition, reference, sense, vacuous name

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2013 Print ISBN-13: 9780199928385
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2013 DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199928385.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Saul A. Kripke, author
CUNY Graduate Center/Princeton University

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