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Preludes to PragmatismToward a Reconstruction of Philosophy$
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Philip Kitcher

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199899555

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199899555.001.0001

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On the Explanatory Role of Correspondence Truth

On the Explanatory Role of Correspondence Truth

Chapter:
(p.110) 4 On the Explanatory Role of Correspondence Truth
Source:
Preludes to Pragmatism
Author(s):

Kitcher Philip

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199899555.003.0005

This chapter attempts to answer the urge to use quotation marks in writing about truth. Its central theme is the possibility of reducing the notion of truth to that of reference, conceiving of reference as an objective relation between signs and language-independent entities, and using Tarski's approach to define “truth.” The chapter also attempts to show how deeply embedded in our everyday accounts of successful behavior—paradigmatically, in our observation of others—is the thought that accurate representation explains behavioral proficiency.

Keywords:   truth, reference, language-independent entities, Tarski, successful behavior, representation, behavioral proficiency

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