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Seemings and Justification
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Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism

Chris Tucker

Abstract

You believe that there is a paper document (or a computer screen) in front of you because it seems visually that way. I believe that I ate cereal for breakfast because I seem to remember eating it for breakfast. And we believe that torturing for fun is morally wrong and that 2+2=4 because those claims seem intuitively obvious. In each of these cases, it is natural to think that our beliefs are not only based on a seeming, but also that they are justifiably based on these seemings—at least assuming there is no relevant counterevidence. These considerations have prompted many to endorse some ver ... More

Keywords: dogmatism, phenomenal conservatism, cognitive penetration, epistemic internalism, intuition, non-inferential justification

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2013 Print ISBN-13: 9780199899494
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2013 DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199899494.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Chris Tucker, editor
The College of William and Mary

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