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The Varieties of Consciousness$

Uriah Kriegel

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780199846122

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199846122.001.0001

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(p.273) Bibliography

(p.273) Bibliography

Source:
The Varieties of Consciousness
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Oxford University Press

Bibliography references:

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