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Against Absolute Goodness
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Against Absolute Goodness

Richard Kraut

Abstract

Are there things we should value because they are, quite simply, good? If so, such things might be said to have “absolute goodness.” They would be good simpliciter or full stop—not good for someone, not good of a kind, but nonetheless good (period). They might also be called “impersonal values.” The reason why we ought to value such things, if there are any, would merely be the fact that they are, quite simply, good things. In the 20th century, G. E. Moore was the great champion of absolute goodness, but he is not the only philosopher who posits the existence and importance of this property. A ... More

Keywords: value, good, absolute goodness, impersonal values, G. E. Moore, property, practical reasoning

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2012 Print ISBN-13: 9780199844463
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2012 DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199844463.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Richard Kraut, author
Northwestern University

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